









Name: Dumisani Gumbi 
Student Number: GMBDUM002 
Qualification Registered for: LLM Degree in Commercial Law 
Dissertation Title: 
‘Understanding the threat of cybercrime: A comparative study of cybercrime
and the ICT legislative frameworks of South Africa, Kenya, India, the United 
States and the United Kingdom’.
Supervisor’s name: Professor Caroline Ncube









wnThe copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be
published without full acknowledgement of the source.
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only.
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.
2 
Declaration 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of 
the requirements for the Masters of Law (LLM) Degree in approved courses and a 
minor dissertation.  The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the 
completion of a programme of courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of Masters of Law (LLM) Degree dissertations, including those relating 
to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this 
dissertation conforms to those regulations. 
19/02/2018 
Mr. Dumisani Gumbi Date 
GMBDUM002 
Keywords 
Breach, broadband, board of directors, computer crime, conventions, cyber-attack, 
cybercrime, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, cybersecurity, cyber warfare, cyber 
risk management, cyber liability, cyber insurance, common law, critical information 
infrastructure, directors, fiduciary duty, internet access, illegal access, internet crime, 
legislation, jurisdiction, policy, personal information, Companies Act, Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity related matters Bill.  
3 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the supervision and guidance of 
Professor Caroline Ncube, without whom this study would not have seen the light of 
day. Thank you also to my sponsors, Parliament of South Africa and the Sanlam 
Group for the financial backing and support needed to undertake and complete these 
studies. To my manager and coach, Johan Marnewick, I am so grateful for your 
teachings and mentorship. Thank you to all my family and friends for being 
relentless cheerleaders, I hope to have done you proud.  
Lastly, to Busisiwe and Rorisang-Morena Gumbi, thank you for bearing with me 
throughout this journey and for the constant reassurance and understanding. This is 
















Malila ngomkhonto abanye belila ngezinyembezi, 
Siguguda senyathi, 




As broadband infrastructure investments in developing nations intensify and barriers 
to accessing the internet diminish, the more they increasingly become the 
quintessential destination for cybercrime.  For their lax cyber laws and general 
cybercrime illiteracy, developing nations such as South Africa, Kenya, and India 
have become the destination of choice for cybercriminal enterprises.  
The focus of this dissertation is to comparatively analyse South Africa’s ICT 
regulatory framework against those of developing and developed nations and to 
determine its effectiveness in addressing the threat posed by cybercrime. This 
dissertation hopes to contribute towards establishing a greater understanding and 
appreciation of the scourge of cybercrime by studying the frameworks, structures, 
and arrangements, installed to safeguard against cybercrime in developing nations, 
namely Kenya and India, and developed nations, namely the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  
Some of the key challenges identified in the dissertation, arising from the 
analysis of South Africa’s cyber laws and policy framework, point to legislation that 
is out of date and in desperate need of revision; a lack of definitional clarity for 
cybercrime-related terminology; jurisdiction limitations for international cybercrimes 
investigations, no harmonisation with international laws, standards, and a poor 
record of implementing strategy and policies.  
The dissertation concludes that the battle against cybercrime cannot be won 
without first understanding what cybercrime is. Developing a common 
understanding of cybercrime and related terminology, the implementation of the 
necessary Information and Communication Technology (ICT) strategies, policies, 
and regulatory frameworks, are thus recommended. Concluding international 
cooperation and mutual assistance agreements to assist with transnational cybercrime 
investigations and prosecutions is paramount. Establishing cross-sector, intra-
ministerial, public-private, and multinational partnerships is also vital to managing 
the threat of cybecrime. Lastly, this dissertation recommends the development of 
dedicated cybersecurity and cybercrime mechanisms for the prosecution and 
safeguarding of the nation’s critical information infrastructure, the mission critical 
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information of corporates and the personal information of citizens against 
cybercrime.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose of the research 
The purpose of this work is to establish an understanding of the world of cybercrime 
and the threat it poses to citizens, corporations, and nation states. This dissertation 
examines the definition of cybercrime and associated, distinct terminology 
commonly used with it or in relation to it. It also looks at the cybercrime system and 
analyses the role players concerned, their motives, and their primary targets. The 
legislation, policies, and information communications and technology (ICT) 
regulatory frameworks, especially formulated to address the threat of cybercrime in 
developing nations (Kenya and India) and developed nations (the United States and 
the United Kingdom), are comparatively analysed throughout this dissertation and 
used to determine South Africa’s readiness to combat and safeguard against 
cybercrime.    
1.2 Problem Statement and Research question 
The chosen countries that form the basis of the comparative analysis have legal 
systems that mainly consist of combinations of English law, common law, and 
constitutional law. These laws apply to traditional crimes such as harassment, 
assault, theft, and fraud. When applied to technology-enabled criminal offences, 
these traditional laws fall short and are inadequate to address the myriad of evolving 
computer offences. This has led to the introduction of new legislation to keep abreast 
of technology-enabled crimes. 
The objective of this dissertation is to comparatively analyse South Africa’s ICT 
regulatory framework against those of developing and developed nations in order to 
determine whether it adequately addresses the risk of cybercrime. This analysis 
considers the definitions of the cybercrime lexicon, the duties of boards of directors 
to safeguard corporate mission-critical information, the safeguarding of national 
critical information infrastructure by nation states, and the reparation of the victims 
of cybercrime. 
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1.3 Chapter outline  
This dissertation comprises six chapters, the first establishing the state and 
importance of provision of internet and broadband access within South Africa. The 
second chapter lays the foundation for the remainder of the dissertation and explores 
the various terms and definitions associated with cybercrime, namely: computer 
crime, cybersecurity, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare. Having 
established what cybercrime is not, the third chapter unpacks the concept of 
cybercrime further by exploring its classification, categories, various forms, 
perpetrators and how to quantify the cost of cybercrime. Chapter four considers the 
measures and arrangements in place to safeguard against cybercrime. The duty of a 
nation to protect its critical information infrastructure is explored, furthermore, the 
fiduciary duty of a board of directors to protect its corporations mission critical data 
against cyber risks is also discussed. Chapter five discusses some of the key 
challenges contributing to the current state of South Africa’s ICT regulatory 
frameworks and level of preparedness to address the risk of cybercrime. The 
dissertation culminates in chapter six which considers some recommendations and 
possible ways forward. 
1.4 Context: Internet and Enabling Technologies 
To herald the dawn of the internet era, Thomas M Siebel equates the meteoric rise to 
prominence of the world wide web to a watershed moment for humankind and writes 
in Cyber Rules: Strategies for excelling at e-business (1999): 
[E]very so often an event occurs that is so startling in its economic
implications that it may reasonably be considered a watershed in the way we
do business. By “watershed” we mean an abrupt and irrevocable turning
point, one that signals a shift in historical direction by obliterating an
established set of business practices and replacing them with a new
commercial paradigm.1
As predicted by Siebel, the invention and uptake of the internet was truly a digital 
watershed moment. It surpassed all expectations and revolutionised most industries. 
1 T Siebel and P House Cyber Rules: Strategies for excelling at e-business (1999) 1. 
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Many believe that the internet is the precursor that will usher in the fourth industrial 
revolution.  
‘The first industrial revolution used water and steam power to mechanize 
production. The Second used electric power to create mass production. The Third 
used electronics and information technology to automate production. Now a Fourth 
Industrial Revolution is building on the Third, the digital revolution that has been 
occurring since the middle of the last century. It is characterized by a fusion of 
technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological 
spheres.’2   
As with any of the great technological inventions, the internet may be used positively 
for the advancement of humanity or misused to bring about human and systemic loss 
and suffering. Gilbert Ryle3 uses the term ‘ghost in the machine’ to dispute the 
notion of the mind being distinct from the body and that mental states are separable 
from physical states. In the same vein as argued by Ryle, there seems to be a ghost in 
the World Wide Web machine that has resulted in the internet becoming the de-facto 
primary domain for cybercrimes. Over time the internet has ‘developed’ an alternate, 
ulterior, and parallel personality in the form of the Dark Web4 where encrypted, 
unlawful services and markets between organisations and individuals, can thrive 
under the cloak of secrecy and anonymity. When compared to older generation 
technologies like the railway, television, telephone, automobile, and airplane, the 
transformative role that the internet has played in fostering the exchange and flow of 
licit and illicit activities across countries is unprecedented. The invention of the 
internet has greatly profited criminal enterprises in much the same way modern 
weaponry has previously ‘facilitated the implementation of large-scale mass 
murders.’5As cyberspace6 is borderless, interconnected and filled with unsecured 
content from unsuspecting users, it has become an attractive platform for criminals 
to spread their criminal enterprises onto the internet. 
2 K Schwab ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’ World Economic 
Forum, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/1pBfye4, accessed on 02 April 2017. 
3 G Ryle The Concept of the Mind (2002) 12.  
4 D Glance ‘What is the Dark Web?’, available at http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-
dark-web-46070, 2017, accessed on 12 December 2017.  
5 N Kshetri Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South (2013) 5. 
6 Term coined by William Gibson in 1982 and applied to the internet by Howard Rheingold. 
Cyberspace itself refers to the set of links and relationships between objects that are accessible 
through a generalised telecommunications network and to the set of objects themselves where they 
present interfaces allowing their remote control, remote access to data, or their participation in control 
actions within that Cyberspace. 
11 
The continual evolution of technologies, particularly the internet, inadvertently, 
breeds newer forms of computer-enabled crimes, targets, and perpetrators. Newer 
and more specialised, computer-crime7 laws are now needed to fend off the modern 
day criminals and the unconventional crimes they carry out over the internet and 
computing technologies.  
Cybercriminal activity is said to be at its highest on the African continent, 
due to the limited understating of information technologies, the naivety and absolute 
trust in the safety of transacting on the internet owing largely to high levels of 
illiteracy. There are few suitable laws to effectively deal with cybercrimes in many 
of the countries on the Africa continent8. As a continent that is primarily focussed on 
overcoming the HIV/aids pandemic, poverty, rising unemployment, basic service 
delivery, crime, and eradicating corruption9, developing cyberlaws receives 
secondary attention, thus leaving the continent susceptible to malicious cyber-
criminal activities. 
The current set of laws and policies dealing with cyber security in South 
Africa are inadequate and ineffective. They have not kept up with cyber-threats and 
suffer implementation challenges due to a lack of administrative will, poor 
coordination of inter-governmental mandates and ineffective implementation 
programmes.10 It is not only the laws that will need to be modernised and brought in 
line with the advances of technology. Industries and professionals must also evolve 
if they are to survive and still benefit society. 
1.5 State of Internet Access and the ICT Policy Framework in South Africa 
Given the rate of contribution to South Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP), 
access to the internet is a key stimulus for job creation and a faster contributor than 
the offline economies, contributing up to 5.5% per annum (on average) to the overall 
7 F Cassim ‘Formulating specialised legislation to address the growing spectre of cybercrimes: a 
comparative study’ (2009) 12 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 37.  
8 International Telecommunication Union ‘Global Cybersecurity Index 2017 Africa Report’, 2017, 
available at http://bit.ly/2C3zrRn, accessed on 29 December 2017. 
9 F Cassim ‘Addressing the spectre of cyber terrorism: A comparative perspective’ (2012) 15 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 394.  
10 D Mangena ‘Will legislation protect your virtual space? Discussing the draft Cybercrime and Cyber 
Security Bill’ (2016) De Rebus. 
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GDP growth11. Elsie Kanza of the World Economic Forum (WEF), recently reported 
the following about the potential of the internet in South Africa: 
‘Forty-eight percent of South Africans between the ages of 15 and 34 are 
unemployed... The Fourth Industrial Revolution offers South Africa, and Africa - a 
continent where 70% of the population is under 30 - a real opportunity to use digital 
technology to leapfrog growth and to emerge as key players in the technology 
sector.’12    
Although the South African government has undertaken to invest in the ICT sector 
and through it, to improve the quality of lives and prospects of its citizens, its efforts 
fall short. Some of the government’s key ICT Policy frameworks, strategies and/or 
related programmes for realising its ICT intentions are discussed below.  
1.5.1 The National Development Plan 
The National Development Plan, 2030 (NDP) launched in 2012 by the National 
Planning Commission, is a blueprint for how the country can eliminate poverty and 
reduce inequality by the year 2030.  The medium term target of the NDP, from 2015 
to 2020, is that there should be 100 percent broadband access to all schools, health 
facilities, and similar social institutions whilst ensuring that individual citizens have 
access to affordable information and voice communication services.13 The NDP’s 
hopes for 2030 are, to lead South Africa to becoming a connected information 
society that fully participates in a vibrant, innovative, prosperous, and inclusive 
knowledge economy.14 It is hoped that this society will be realised through the 
provisioning of universally accessible, reliable, and affordable broadband access that 
will empower all and unlock mass access to global ICT commercial opportunities.  
The Infrastructure Development Act 23 of 2014, through which the strategic 
integrated projects were realised, resulted in the commencement of the Strategic 
Integrated Project 15 (SIP15): Expanding Access to Communication Technology. 
This project aims to prioritise the establishment of national backbone infrastructure 
11 Ibid. 
12 E Kanza ‘How universal internet access could reboot South Africa’ (16/062017) World Economic 
Forum, available at http://bit.ly/2z9sgcx, accessed on 15 November 2017.  
13 National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan 2030’ (2011) 178. 
14 Ibid. 
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and to provide connectivity to e-health, e-schools and e-government facilities. Some 
of the key mid-term targets of the SIP (15) are to provide broadband access to all 
households, to migrate from analogue to digital national TV broadcasting and to 
improve regulation and competition within the sector.15  
1.5.2 The New Growth Path 
Complimentary to the NDP is the New Growth Path (NGP) which came about 
because of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). The NGP’s target is the creation 
of 100 000 new jobs by the year 2020 in the knowledge-intensive sectors of ICT, 
higher education, healthcare, mining-related technologies, pharmaceuticals, and 
biotechnology16. These targets are informed by the belief that a functional 
information and technology sector will greatly enable substantial employment 
creation. 
The long-term year (2030) IPAP targets are as follows: 
 100% of population to have internet (broadband) access of 10mbps speed;
 80% of population to have internet (broadband) access of 100mbps speed;
 100% of schools to have internet (broadband) access of 1gbps speed;
 100% of health facilities to have internet (broadband) access of 1gbps speed;
 100% of government facilities to have internet (broadband) access of
100mbps speed.
1.5.3 South Africa Connect: Creating Opportunities, Ensuring Inclusion. South 
Africa’s Broadband Policy (South Africa Connect) 
The National Broadband Policy of 2013 (also referred to as South Africa Connect), 
has the following vision for 2020: that all citizens must have access to broadband 
15 Presidential Infrastructure Coordination Commission ‘A summary of the South African 
infrastructure plan’, 2012, available at http://bit.ly/2EdBjJy, accessed on 31 October 2017.  
16 N Nattrass ‘The new growth path: Game changing vision or cop-out?’107 South African Journal of 
Science (2011) 4. 
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and related services at a cost of 2,5% or less of the population’s average monthly 
income17.  
The broadband access targets that South Africa has set for itself are comparable to 
the global targets set by the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) 
Connect 2020: Global telecommunication/information and communications 
technology goals and targets18. The target set for household access to the internet by 
the year 2020 is 55% and the target for access to the internet by individuals is 60%. 
The targets set by South Africa therefore, are in line with global standards, if not 
slightly more ambitious. 
Despite the various government strategies, policies, frameworks, and targets set by 
the South African government for itself, universal access to broadband and related 
services remains a challenge as essential targets and deadlines are consistently 
missed. According to the World Bank19, the GDP in developed nations can be grown 
by up to 1.21% from a 10% increase in fixed broadband penetration. The same 
broadband penetration can benefit the GDP’s of developing economies by as much 
as 1.38%. SA only has 20% broadband penetration. The number of internet users in 
South Africa has grown beyond 21million, meaning that roughly 40% of the 
population now has access to the internet. With the world average for internet 
penetration currently at 46%, South Africa is not far behind.20 
17 Ellipsis ‘Policy direction on effective competition in broadband markets’, 2016 available at 
http://bit.ly/2BiUouT, accessed on 21 August 2017. 
18 Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union ‘International 
Telecommunications Union resolution ’Connect 2020 Agenda for global 
telecommunication/information and communication technology development’ adopted in Busan 
,2014, available at http://bit.ly/2FXvRLa, accessed on 11 December 2017. 
19 M Minges ‘Exploring the Relationship Between Broadband and Economic Growth’ World 
Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/2lZTn4p, accessed on 7 
December 2017. 
20 G Van Zyl ‘Ripe for a digital revolution: 40% of SA now has internet access – study’ ,2017, 
available at https://www.biznews.com/tech/2017/07/19/sa-internet-access-study/, accessed on 17 
November 2017.  
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The WEF’s Network Readiness Index21 assesses countries using the 
following four categories:  
1. The overall environment for technology use and creation;
2. Networked readiness in terms of ICT infrastructure, affordability, and skills;
3. Technology adoption/usage by the three groups of stakeholders (government,
the private sector, and private individuals); and
4. The economic and social impact of the new technologies.
South Africa, ranked 65th, is behind 5th ranked United States of America (USA), and 
the United Kingdom (UK) in position eight. South Africa did however rank higher 
than Kenya, 86th and India at 91. 
Despite the Constitution22, polices, strategies, and plans of the South African 
government to provide all with access to quality, responsive internet access, the 
South African government with Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and India, voted 
against the United Nations Human Rights Council non-binding resolution on ‘the 
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet’23 in June 2016. 
This resolution condemns countries that intentionally take away or disrupt its 
citizens’ internet access. It stresses that people must be allowed to enjoy the same 
rights they have offline when online. The right of freedom of expression is protected 
by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The RSA government has acted contrary to 
Article 19 and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
21 World Economic Forum ‘Global Information Technology Report 2016’, 2016, available at 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-information-technology-report-2016/networked-readiness-index, 
accessed on 15 November 2017.  
22 Section 16 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, does not explicitly protect 
internet freedom but states that everyone has the right to ‘freedom to receive or impart information or 
ideas’. This is a right for everyone and it is not just a freedom from interference but is a right to 
communicate with other and to also be reached by others. 
23 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘32nd session of the Human Rights Council (13 June to 1 
July and 8 July 2016’, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/1rK70TS, accessed on 30 November 2017. 
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As the number of internet connections increases in South Africa, so too will 
the risk of cybercrime. These gains cannot simply be undone and jeopardised by 
cyber criminals seeking to compromise and limit the positive change that stand to be 
realised through the increased internet access. This access will need to be reliable, 
secured and trustworthy.   
2. DEFINITIONS (COMPUTER-RELATED CRIMES, CYBERCRIME,
CYBERSECURITY, CYBERWAR, CYBER-ESPIONAGE AND CYBER
TERRORISM)
Technological advances, though positive and inspirational by nature, also create 
opportunities for criminals and introduce newer types of crimes. Considering that 
criminals do not need a computer to commit fraud, traffic in child pornography, 
commit intellectual property fraud, steal an identity, or violate someone’s privacy, 
these traditional crimes have now become easier to carry out in the digital era. 
Stevenson, when explaining how ethical definitions involve a wedding of descriptive 
and emotive meaning, argues that ‘[t]o choose a definition is to plead a cause’1, 
meaning that definitions in and of themselves, can encourage future actions.   
Before a comparison and evaluation of the various legislative frameworks in 
question can be undertaken, it is essential to establish an understanding of, and to 
distinguish between, the following terms: cybercrime, cybersecurity, cyber-
espionage, cyberterrorism, and cyberwar(fare). These terms are commonly used to 
refer to varying criminal acts involving computers, mobile devices, communication 
networks and the internet. They remain misunderstood and increasingly misused in 
common parlance and in academia.   
2.1 Cybercrime 
Cybercrime is commonly described as the criminal use of computer technology and 
is said to be a form of crime that happens in the world of computers and the internet, 
known as cyberspace. As coined in 1995 by Sussman and Heuston, the term 
‘cybercrime’ is best considered as a series of criminal acts, ‘based on the material 
offence object and modus operandi that affect computer data or systems.’2  
1 G Kisicek & IZ Zagar ‘What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and argumentative 
perspectives’,2013, available at http://bit.ly/2C6f2LD, accessed on 20 April 2017. 
2 R Sabillon et al ‘Cybercriminals, cyberattacks and cybercrime. Privacy, security and control’ (2016) 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 3. 
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There appears to be no precise definition for cybercrime or 'computer crime'.3 Nor 
does there seem to be a globally accepted standardised definition for cybercrime. It is 
argued that the term is a misnomer that describes criminal behaviour where the 
computer or computer networks may be a source, tool, target, or a place of criminal 
activity.4 The term is also used interchangeably with computer crime, electronic 
crime, high-technology crime, information age crime, cybernetic crime, computer-
related crime, or digital crime.  
The development of a common language to facilitate sound collaboration and 
further research on this subject matter requires clearly defined and understood 
cybercrime terminology.5 Although it is essential to develop a common definition for 
cybercrime, at a country level, this process is subject to sovereign decisions and an 
object of international cooperation and application. 
2.1.1 Computer Crime 
Computer crime has been described as ‘any violation of criminal law that involves 
knowledge of computer technology by the perpetrator, investigator or prosecution’6. 
Cybercrimes differ from computer crimes in that they most often involve 
connectivity between software and/or the flow of information. Conversely, 
computer-related crimes encompass offences committed without the presence of a 
computer network, affecting only stand-alone computer systems.7Cybercrime is thus 
a sub-category of computer crime.  
The following section considers the definitions of the cybercrime 
terminology in question, by subject country, starting with east and southern Africa 
and then proceeding to the USA and the UK.  
3 Internet Safety Campaign Africa ‘Cybercrime Definition’ available at 
http://cybercrime.org.za/definition accessed on 29 March 2017. 
4 R Arora ‘Introduction to Cyber-crimes, cyber security, and legal aspects’, available at, 
http://bit.ly/2FZPB0S, 2013, accessed on 07 April 2017.  
5 S Gordon & R Ford ‘On the definition and classification of cybercrime’ (2006) 2 Journal of 
Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques 17. 
6 Cassim op cit (n7) 36.  
7 M Gercke ‘Understanding Cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges, and legal responses.’ 2012, 
available at, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime%20legislation%20EV6.pdf, 
accessed on 5 April 2017. 
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i. Eastern and South(ern) African Definitions of Cybercrime
Papadopoulos defines cybecrime as ‘any unlawful conduct involving a computer or 
computer system or computer network, irrespective of whether it is the object of the 
crime or instrumental in the commission of the crime.’8 
Kenya’s primary legislation for cyber security and related matters, the 
Information and Communications Amendment (ICA) Act of 2013, fails to tender a 
definition of cybercrime. The National Cybersecurity Strategy is also silent on the 
definition of cybercrime. The 2017 Computer and Cybercrimes Act, defines 
cybercrime offences and is a powerful tool for the investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrimes, but it also does not define cybercrime.  
Section 10 of South Africa’s 2012 Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act (ECTA), Amendment Bill9, defines cybercrime as ‘any criminal or 
other offence that is facilitated by or involves the use of electronic communications 
or information systems, including any device or the internet or any one or more of 
them.’10 The Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa of 2015 further 
defines cybercrime as ‘illegal acts, the commission of which involves the use of 
information and communication technologies.’11 There is no definition of cybercrime 
in the 2017 Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity (CAC) Bill. 
The ITU & African Union (AU) cybercrime model law12 contains provisions 
relating to cybercrime, but leaves the defining of the cybercrime to the individual 
jurisdictions to develop. Similarly, the 2008 East African Community (EAC) Legal 
8 M Watney Cybercrime and the investigation of cybercrime in S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) 
Cyberlaw@SA  3ed (2012) 336. 
9 Bill may not be passed. Has laid fallow for six years and due to be replaced by Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill, 2017. 
10 s10 of ECTA, Amendment Bill,2012.   
11 National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa (2015). 
12 Harmonisation of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa (HIPSSA) ‘Computer Crime and Cybercrime 
SADC Model Law’ 2008 International Telecommunications Union. 
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Framework for Cyberlaws13, the 2010 Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) Model Law on Electronic Transactions, the 2011 Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern (COMESA) Africa Cyber Crime Model Bill and 
the 2014 African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Data Protection, all do not 
furnish their member states with a definition for cybercrime either. 
ii.International Definitions of Cybercrime 
Kshteri defines cybercrime as ‘criminal activity in which computers or computer 
networks are the principal means of committing an offence or violating laws, rules or 
regulations.’14  
India’s Information Technology (IT) Act of 2000 and its 2008 amendment, 
do not define the term cybercrime. Section 43(j)(i) of the Act however, introduces 
the following term ‘computer contaminant’15 together with cybercrime offences and 
penalties. There is also no definition of cybercrime in the 2013 National Cyber 
Security Policy of India.  
The UK National cyber security strategy of 2016, categorises cybercrimes 
into cyber-enabled and cyber-dependant cybercrimes, without defining cybercrime. 
The Computer Misuse Act of 1990 and the arsenal of cyber laws16 in the UK, create 
cybercrime offences and penalties but none offer a definition for cybercrime.  
The European Commission defines cybercrime for the region as follows: 
‘Cybercrime consists of criminal acts that are committed online by using electronic 
communications networks and information systems.’17 The WEF’s definition of 
13 Not intended to create legal obligations for member states but designed to serve as inspiration or 
models for the development of national legislative provisions.   
14 N Kshteri Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South 2013 6. 
15 ‘(i) Computer contaminant’ means any set of computer instructions that are designed– (a) to 
modify, destroy, record, transmit data or programme residing within a computer, computer system or 
computer network; or (b) by any means to usurp the normal operation of the computer, computer 
system, or computer network.   
16 ‘Cyber Crime – Legal Guidance’ The Crown Prosecutors 2017, available at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/cybercrime-legal-guidance, accessed on 17 December 2017. 
17 ‘Cybercrime’ European Commission, 2017, available at, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/cybercrime_en, accessed on 19 April 2017. 
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cybercrime adds to the definition supplied by the European Union (EU) in that 
cybercrimes are also those criminal activities that are traditional crimes but are 
further enabled or aggravated by the internet.18   
In the USA, federal computer offences are defined in and dealt with through 
the United States Code19, the Uniting, and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATRIOT) 
Act20, the Racketeer and Influenced Corrupt Organisation Act21, and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act22, none of which contain a definition for cybercrime. 
The United Nations (UN) defines cybercrime in two ways. Narrowly - as the 
‘illegal behaviour directed by means of electronic operations that targets the security 
of computer systems and the data processed by them’23 and more broadly defined, 
cybercrimes is ‘any illegal behaviour committed by means of, or in relation to, a 
computer system or network, including such crimes as illegal possession and 
offering or distributing information by means of a computer system or network.’24
Although there is still no universally acceptable definition for cybercrime, 
those jurisdictions that have defined this term seem to have the same goal of 
criminalising trans-border cybercriminal activities perpetuated by or directed at data, 
computers, and/or computer networks through the internet. The journey towards 
effective regulating, prosecuting and the combating of cybercrime begins with the 
ability to accurately define and distinguish cybercrimes from related incidents such 
18 J Vez ‘Recommendations for Public-Private Partnerships against Cybercrime’ WEF, 2016, 
available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cybercrime_Principles.pdf, accessed on 19 April 
2017. 
19 A Rees ‘Cybercrime Laws of the United States’ US Department of Justice: Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section 2006 available at https://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/us_cyb_laws.pdf 
accessed on 10 February 2018.  
20 The Uniting, and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 
21 18 U.S.C §1961-68. 
22 18 U.S.C §1830. 
23 ‘Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders’ United 
Nations 2000, available at http://bit.ly/2kjJFXN accessed on 19 December 2017. 
24 Ibid. 
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as cyber espionage, cyber warfare, and cyber terrorism. This distinction is essential 
and may be the difference between an investigation being undertaken in the interest 
of local law enforcement or national security for instance. 
2.2 Cybersecurity 
The next commonly misused and misunderstood term is ‘cybersecurity’. The 
common technical definition means to safeguard and prevent incidents of 
cybercrime. Failure to accurately define this term means failure to task the relevant 
functions to ensure protection from, and/or prosecution of incidents of cybercrime. 
This term was initially used to refer to officials responsible for addressing security 
concerns emanating from the internet or cyberspace. Cybersecurity, is often 
incorrectly referenced as a synonym for the terms ‘IT security’, ‘ICT security’ or 
‘information security’. There appears to be no precise definition for cybersecurity 
either. Many jurisdictions and regional economic communities have legislative 
provisions relating to cybersecurity but none provide a definition for the term.  
i. Eastern and South(ern) African Definitions of Cybersecurity
Both South Africa’s (ECTA) Amendment Bill of 2012 and the (CAC) Bill,2017, 
contain provisions related to cybersecurity, but provide no definition for the term. 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework of 2015, defines cybersecurity as the 
securing of ‘networks that constitute cyberspace against intrusions, maintaining 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of information, detecting intrusions and 
incidents that do occur, and responding to and recovering from them.’25 Like South 
Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) model law for 
cybercrime26 also has provisions addressing cybersecurity, but does not define the 
term, leaving it to the member states to develop in their own jurisdictions. 
25 Ibid. 
26 HIPSSA (2008) ‘Computer Crime and Cybercrime SADC Model Law.’ 
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Section 2(c) of Kenya’s ICA Act defines cyber security as a ‘collection of 
tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management 
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be 
used to protect the cyber environment.’27. Neither the 2008 EAC Legal Framework 
for Cyberlaws, the 2010 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) Model Law on Electronic Transactions, nor the 2011 Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Cyber Crime Model Bill, define 
‘cybersecurity’ for the East African region. They only contain cybersecurity related 
provisions. The 2014 African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Data 
Protection28 also fails to provide a definition for cybersecurity. 
ii. International Definitions of Cybersecurity
The ITU describes the objective of cybersecurity as securing the assets of a 
corporation or nation against cyber threats and risks.29  
India’s Information Technology Amendment (ITA) Act of 2008 defines 
cybersecurity as ‘protecting information, equipment, devices, computing, computer 
resources, communication devices and information stored therein from unauthorised 
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction.’30 
The US National Initiative for Cybersecurity Career and Studies’ extended definition 
of cybersecurity is as follows: 
‘Strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in 
cyberspace, and encompass the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability 
reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and 
recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information 
assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they 
relate to the security and stability of the global information and communications 
infrastructure.’31  
27 s2(c) of Information Communication and Technology Amendment Act of 2013, Kenya. 
28 Although adopted, this convention is not yet in force as the requisite ratification has not yet been 
achieved. In accordance with article 36, a minimum of 15 ratifications are required for the convention 
to enter force. available at http://bit.ly/2nVb9Es, accessed on 5 February 2018. 
29 ITU ‘Definition of Cybersecurity’ 2017, available at, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/studygroups/com17/Pages/cybersecurity.aspx accessed on 24 May 2017. 
30 s2(D)(b) of ITA Act of 2008, India. 
31 National Initiative for Cybersecurity Career and Studies ‘A Glossary of common cybersecurity 
terminology’ US Department of Homeland Security 2017, available at https://niccs.us-
cert.gov/glossary#C accessed 24 May 2017. 
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The UK Computer Misuse Act of 1990 does not define ‘cybersecurity’. The 
United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strategy defines ‘cybersecurity’ as ‘the 
protection of internet-connected systems (to include hardware, software and 
associated infrastructure), the data on them, and the services they provide, from 
unauthorised access, harm or misuse.’ 32   
The EU Agency for Network and Information Security’s definition of 
cybersecurity is the ‘protection of information, information systems and 
infrastructure from those threats that are associated with using ICT systems in a 
globally connected environment.’33. 
Cybersecurity governance measures include technical, organizational, policy, 
and legal aspects. Promoting good cyber security also involves the creation of laws 
that prohibit all acts that are contrary to the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information, systems, and critical information infrastructure. These laws enacted 
to bolster cyber security should not only concern themselves about the securing 
systems and networks but should also criminalise computer enabled criminal acts.34 
32 UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 – 2021 (2016) 33.  
33 U Helmbrecht ‘ENISA at the service of the EU’s cyber security’ European Union Agency for 
Network and Information Security 2015, available at http://bit.ly/2BBWUed accessed on 24 May 
2017. 
34 UJ Orji, ‘Multilateral Legal Responses to Cyber Security in Africa: Any Hope for Effective 
International Cooperation?’ NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 2015, available 
at, https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2015/proceedings/08_orji.pdf, accessed on 29 August 2017. 
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2.3 Cyber espionage 
Where the target of cybercrime activities ranges from competitors, key infrastructure 
or utilities providers, large enterprises, military, governments, and the motive of the 
attack is to illegally acquire private information for industrial, economic, political, or 
military gain, then it is more than ordinary acts of cybercrime. They are illicit 
intelligence gathering acts of cyber espionage, aimed at acquiring intellectual 
property or government secrets and may further lead to industrial, economic or 
political espionage. It is essential therefore, to be able to define, identify and 
distinguish instances of cyber-espionage from incidents of cybercrime so that the 
appropriate actors can be deployed. Failure to do this may result in incidents of 
cyber-espionage being classified as standard cyber-attacks.  
i. Eastern and South(ern) African Definitions of Cyber-Espionage
Cyber-espionage or related terms have not been defined in South Africa’s ECTA 
Amendment Bill, 2012 nor the CAC Bill,2017. However, the latter defines the term 
‘restricted computer system’35, which sufficiently defines and criminalises acts of 
cyber-espionage within South Africa. The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework 
for South Africa defines cyber-espionage as ‘the act or practice of obtaining secrets 
without the permission of the holder of the information (personal, sensitive, 
proprietary or of classified nature), from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, 
governments and enemies for personal, economic, political or military advantage.’36 
For SADC member states, the 2008 cybercrime model law contains 
provisions related to ‘data espionage’, but offers no definition for the term ‘cyber-
espionage’.    
35 Means any data, computer program, computer data storage medium or computer system under the 
control of, or exclusively used by—(i) any financial institution;(ii) an organ of state as set out in 
section 239 of the Constitution; or (ii) a Critical Information Infrastructure. 
36 National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa (2015) 8. 
26 
Similarly, Kenya’s ICA Act, does not contain a definition for cyber-
espionage. The 2017 Computer and Cybercrimes Act on the other hand, only 
contains a definition for ‘protected computer system’37 but has provisions 
criminalising cyber-espionage, although the term is not defined therein. 
The East African Economic Community model laws and frameworks such as 
the 2008 EAC Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, the 2011 COMESA Cyber Crime 
Model Bill and the 2010 COMESA Model Law on Electronic Transactions, contain 
provisions related to cyber-espionage, such as unauthorised access to computer 
programs, computer data and traffic data, but offer no definition for ‘cyber- 
espionage’.   
The AU Convention on Cybercrime and Data Protection 2014 does also not 
offer the continent a definition for cyber-espionage in its model law. 
ii. International Definitions of Cyber-Espionage
The Tallinn Manual defines cyber-espionage as ‘any act undertaken clandestinely or 
under false pretences that uses cyber capabilities to gather (or attempt to gather 
information) with the intention of communicating it to the opposing party.’38  
Sabillon defines it as ‘acts that involve exfiltration, unauthorized access, 
interception, and acquisition of data.’39 Cyber-espionage may constitute cyber-
attacks aimed at illegally obtaining sensitive information and data from financial, 
government and utility providers. Scholars of information warfare often use the 
terms cyber espionage and computer operations interchangeably. Depending on the 
37 s10(2) - means a computer system used directly in connection with, or necessary for (a), the 
security, defence or international relations of Kenya: (c) the provision of services directly related to 
communications infrastructure, banking and financial services, payment and settlement systems and 
instruments, public utilities or public transportation, including government services delivered 
electronically; (d) the protection of public safety including systems related to essential emergency 
services such as police, civil defence and medical services. 
38 MN Schmitt ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyberwarfare’, 2013, Rule 
66.  
39 R Sabillon et al (2016) 4. 
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context, computer operation can either mean the intelligence and data collection 
from a target or adversary computer systems, or alternatively mean, as defined by the 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ‘attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, 
exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure.’40 
India’s IT Act does not provide a definition for the term ‘cyber-espionage’. 
The closest the Act and the 2008 Amendment Act, come to defining cyber-espionage 
is the criminalising of unauthorised access to ‘protected systems’41.  
The Homeland Security Act42, the PATRIOT Act, and the US Code all 
contain the phrase ‘protected computer’43 and all have cyber-espionage provisions 
for the protection of not only federal computers and their information but extends to 
computers used in interstate or foreign commerce. The US Code44 and the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996 also outlaw unauthorised access to trade secrets by way of 
computer in a commercial setting. Although the listed acts regulate and criminalise 
cyber-espionage, none of them define the term.  
None of the UK IT laws studied contain a definition for ‘cyber-espionage’. 
The National Cyber Security Strategy uses the phrase ‘cyber network exploitation’ 
interchangeably with ‘cyber espionage’, which it defines as ‘the use of a computer 
network to infiltrate a target computer network and gather intelligence.’45 
40 D Weissbrodt ‘Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime And Cyber-Espionage’ 2013, available at 
http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=faculty_articles  
accessed on 29 August 2017. 
41 s70 India Information Technology Act of 2000. 
42 The Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
43 [T]he term ‘protected computer’ means a computer—(A) exclusively for the use of a financial 
institution or the United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such 
use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States Government or (B) which is used in 
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United 
States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the 
United States, 18 U.S.C §1030(𝑒)(2). 
44 18 U.S.C §1832(a).  
45 UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 – 2021 (2016) 74.  
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2.4 Cyber-Terrorism 
Cyber-terrorism is a term that is also often used out of context and not defined. The 
term ‘terrorist’ is mainly used in association with extremist militia whose modus 
operandi is to use grand scale acts of violence and fear to further their political or 
religious ideologies. Shackleford explains that: ‘cyber-terrorists, use cyberspace to 
disrupt computer or telecommunications services to illicit widespread disruptions 
and loss of public confidence in the ability of government to function effectively.’46 
As a recognised form of cybercrime, cyber-terrorism, is said to be about organised 
crime and terrorist groups using sophisticated computer technology to bypass 
government defences and carry out destructive acts of violence. The target of these 
attacks range from information infrastructures, computer systems, computer 
programmes to data.  
The global rise of terrorism-related activities has led to an increased fear and 
broader coverage of cyber-terrorism. This has resulted in the blurring of the 
distinctions between what constitute acts of hacktivism and which are cyber 
terrorism, thus the need to distinctly define the term ‘cyber-terrorism’.  
i. Eastern and South(ern) African Definitions of Cyber-Terrorism
Watney defines cyber-terrorism ‘as the unlawful attack or threat of attack on 
computers and networks and the information stored in them for intimidation or 
coercion of a government or its people for the furtherance of a political or a social 
goal.’47 
46 SJ Shackelford ‘Towards Cyber-peace: Managing Cyberattacks through Polycentric Governance’ 
(2013) 62 American University Law Review 1301  
47 Watney op cit (n8) 337. 
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South Africa’s current set of cyber laws48 and the regional cybercrime model 
law49 do not offer a definition for ‘cyber-terrorism’ but they do contain provisions 
relating to cyber-terrorism, such as the protection of critical databases, protection of 
critical information infrastructure, unauthorised access to data, interception of or 
interference with data, unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tools. The 
term finds definition in the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South 
Africa where it is described as ‘the use of internet based attacks in terrorist activities 
by individuals and groups, including acts of deliberate large scale disruptions of 
computer networks, especially computers attached to the internet.’50  
Kenya’s Information Technology Act and its 2013 Amendment Act are silent 
on the definition of cyber-terrorism. It is in the 2017 Computer and Cybercrimes Bill 
that related provision pertaining to the protection of critical databases and the 
protection of national critical information infrastructure, are found. The 2008 EAC 
Legal Framework for Cyberlaws, the 2010 COMESA Model Law on Electronic 
Transactions and the 2011 COMESA Cyber Crime Model Bill all do not provide a 
definition for the term cyber-terrorism for the East African region.  
The 2014 AU Convention on Cybercrime and Data Protection also does not 
provide a working definition for cyber-terrorism that its member states can reference. 
ii. International Definitions of Cyber-Terrorism
Pollit, authoritatively describes cyber-terrorism as a ‘premeditated, politically 
motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programmes, and 
data which result in violence against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or 
48 ECT Amendment Act of 2012, Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication related Information Act 70 of 2002; Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004; Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001; 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 38 of 1999 and the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill of 2017 
49 HIPSSA (2008) ‘Computer Crime and Cybercrime SADC Model Law’. 
50  National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa (2015) 9. 
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clandestine agents’51. Cyber-terrorism encompasses attacks against life and 
electronic infrastructure which are targeted at national security establishments and 
critical infrastructure. The main aim of the cyber-terrorism attacks is to cause panic 
in society.52 Acts of cyber-terrorism are distinguishable from other forms of 
cybercrime in that they generally disrupt essential services of a nation, can result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear 
and the attacks can lead to bodily injuries, loss of lives, explosions, plane crashes, 
water contamination, or even severe economic loss.  
Section 66(F) of India’s 2008 Amended IT Act contains provisions that 
criminalise acts of cyber-terrorism and corresponding penalties for the crime. There 
is no outright definition within the Act, nor is it defined in the 2013 National Cyber 
Security Policy. 
Close inspection of the USA’s PATRIOT Act of 2001 reveals no definition 
for the term ‘cyber-terrorism’ within it. This despite the act being very pronounced 
on cyber-terrorism and containing provisions such as, deterrence and prevention of 
cyber-terrorism, development, and support of cybersecurity forensic capabilities. The 
Act also calls for the amendment of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 
2001 and parts of title 18 of the United States Code in relation to cyber-terrorism. 
Analysis of the UK legislation, namely, the UK Terrorism Act of 2000, the 
various pieces of cyber legislation53 and the National Cyber Security Strategy 
suggests that there is no official legal definition for the term ‘cyber-terrorism’ in the 
UK. There are however provisions within these laws that regulate ‘cyber-terrorism’. 
51 S Krasavin ‘What is Cyber-Terrorism’ 2002, available at http://bit.ly/1Lnsjm5, accessed on 20 
December 2017. 
52 Cassim op cit (n9) 384. 
53 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001; Terrorism Act of 2006; Computer Misuse 
Amendment Bill 2002; UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 – 2021. 
31 
Regionally, the Council of Europe’s (COE) 2011 Convention on Cybercrime also 
does not provide a definition for its member nations to adopt.  
The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy fashions the definition of cyber-
terrorism to be the: 
‘[I]ntentional use or threat of use of electronic information systems for the 
perpetration of terrorist acts inspired by certain motives with the aim to cause death or 
serious bodily injury, serious material damage, create a state of fear, compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.’54 
2.5 Cyber-war(fare)55 
Defence of national security has evolved over the years from being predominantly 
concerned with protecting tangible physical structures into fifth domain of military 
warfare56, namely ‘information, the veritable lifeblood of our modern economy and 
culture’57. The protection of a nations proprietary information is now deemed a vital 
component of its defence strategy. 
Acts of war are no longer limited to physical military-versus-military 
engagements but now comprise attacks on the most critical national infrastructure, 
which if attacked, could disable a nation without physical exchange of fire.58 The 
extension of the notion of war into the digital or cyber environment, has direct 
consequences for the extent and application of rule of law, the protection of persons, 
preservation of state authority, and stability of the international system.  Concise 
understanding of this area of the law is thus essential to prevent overreach and the 
limitation of civil liberties in the name of ‘war’ or ‘attacks’ against the sovereign 
state.59 
54 UN ‘Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ 2011, available at, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/EGM_cybercrime_2011/Presentations/R
ussia_1_Cybercrime_EGMJan2011.pdf accessed on 30 August 2017. 
55 In this dissertation ‘cyber war’ means an act of war and ‘cyber warfare’ is how the cyberwar is 
carried out. 
56 D Hughes & A Colarik ‘The Hierarchy of Cyber War Definitions’ Massey University 2017   
57 ITU ‘Cybercrime and Espionage’ United Nations 2015 available at www.igmun.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/6-ITU-Synopsis.pdf, accessed on 4 February 2018.  
58 Global Information Assurance (GIAC) Certification Paper ‘Information Warfare: Cyber Warfare is 
the future warfare (2004) at 4. 
59JD Ohlin et al, ‘Cyber War: Law and ethics for virtual conflicts’ (2015) 74 
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i. Eastern and South(ern) African Definitions of Cyberwar(fare)
Watney’s definition of cyberwar or information warfare may be defined as “the 
actions taken to infiltrate, corrupt, disrupt or destroy the information systems of an 
adversary.”60   
South Africa’s ECTA Amendment Bill and CAC Bill,2017contain provisions 
pertaining to cyber warfare. None of them however contain a definition for the term. 
Cyberwar is defined in the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework as: ‘actions by 
a nation or state to penetrate another nation's computers and networks for purposes 
of causing damage or disruption.’61 
Like South African’s cyber laws, Kenya’s IT laws62 regulate cyber war 
without it being defined in in law. The regional legal instruments and model law, 
also contain provisions related to cyber warfare, but offer no definition.  
ii. International Definitions of Cyberwar
There are various definitions for cyberwar internationally. The scholarly 
understanding of the term is: ‘an attack by one hostile nation against the computers 
or networks of another to cause disruption or damage, as compared to a criminal or 
terrorist attack involving private parties.’63 
As cyberwar is a type of information warfare, it is thus paramount to start 
with defining what information warfare is. Information warfare is about ‘actions 
taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, 
information-based processes, information systems, and computer based networks 
while defending one’s own.’64   
60 Watney op cit (n8) 337.  
61 National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa (2015) 8. 
62 IT Act, ICA Act, Computer and cybercrimes Bill 2017. 
63 Shackelford op cit (n46) 1297. 
64 I Porche et al ‘Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries, for an army in a wireless world’, 2013 
available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1100/MG1113/RAND_MG1113.pdf, 
accesses on 10 February 2018 xvi. 
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Cyberwar on the other hand can be defined as the acts of a nation state to 
penetrate another nation’s computer or network to cause it harm or disruption65. 
Cyberwarfare on the other hand, may be defined as ‘the use of network-based 
capabilities of one state to disrupt, deny, degrade, manipulate, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves, of another state.’66 
Cyberwarfare can take one of two forms: it can either be the offensive67 or 
defensive68 kind of cyberwar operations. With the offensive form, intelligence about 
the cyberspace capabilities, configuration, and operations of a country, is regularly 
collected and used against them to disrupt, destabilise and degrade their cyber 
defence arrangements. Conversely, defensive cyberwarfare is mainly about countries 
bolstering their national cyberspace defence capabilities to proactively detect, 
analyse and mitigate against threats to national security- in so doing, designated 
networks and critical infrastructure will be protected.  
The term ‘cyber war’ is not used nor defined within both of India’s IT laws 
and the National Cyber Security Policy. However, there are provisions that directly 
regulate cyber war. 
In the USA, the US Penal Code69 does not include cyberwar amongst the list 
of actions that may be deemed an act of war. The US Code also does not define what 
cyberwar is, nor is the term defined by any of the current sets of laws regulating 
cybercrime. Thus far, the waging of cyberwarfare has been a prerogative of the 
65 D Hughes and A Colarik (2017) 26.   
66 Ibid. 
67 JE Cartwright ‘Cyberspace Operations Lexicon’ US DoD 2011, available at http://www.nsci-
va.org/CyberReferenceLib/2010-11-joint%20Terminology%20for%20Cyberspace%20Operations.pdf 
accessed on 12 December 2017 Para 34. 
68 Ibid Para 11. 
69 18 U.S.C §12331(4). 
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executive in terms of the War Powers Resolution70and the Department of Defence’s 
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace71. Efforts to legislate the declaration of cyber 
war as an act of war are underway as per the proposed Cyber Act of War Bill of 
201772 is before the Senate. Once enacted it will contain provisions related to 
regulating cyber war and hopefully a definition of the term. 
The UK National Cyber Security Strategy and cyber laws73, does not define 
the term ‘cyber war’ although there are provisions dedicated to dealing with national 
cyber-attacks and state-sponsored threats.   
Similarly, UN Article 2(4): prohibition on the use of force, and Article (51): 
inherent right to self-defence, both contain provisions relating to and deemed by the 
International Court of Justice74 to be applicable to ‘cyber war’. The UN Charter does 
not define the term ‘cyber war’ nor does Article 36 of the 1977 additional protocol to 
1949 Geneva conventions. 
2.6 Cyber Lexicon 
The two tables below have been inserted to assist in identifying and 
distinguishing between the various types of computer-based crimes. Table 1 seeks to 
enable correct identification of the category of crime based on three factors, namely 
the motive, target and method of attack deployed by the perpetrator whereas Table 2 
assists in identifying the type of computer-based crime by determining the actors 
involved, namely the perpetrator of the crime and their chosen target.    
70 J Healey and A.J. Wilson ‘Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution’ Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs 2012.  
71 US DoD Strategy for Operations in Cyberspace 2015 Available at http://bit.ly/2mpJ0Yd accessed 
on 24 December 2017 p5. 
72 Cyber Act of War Bill of 2016.  
73 Communications Act of 2003; Civil Contingencies Act 2004; Computer Misuse Amendment Bill 
2002; Data Protection Act 1998; European Union - General Data Protection Regulation; European 
Union - The Network and Information Security Directive 2016/1148. 
74 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, 
1996, para 39. 
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Motivation Target Method 
Cyber crime Economic gain Individuals, companies Malware for fraud, 
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75 Kshteri op cit (n14) 25. 
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theft, DDOS for 
blackmail 

























Table 2: Identifying computer-based crimes by category of actors involved.76 
Defining cyber-criminal terms is not only essential from the perspective of a 
local jurisdictions but it is equally essential for international harmonisation of terms 
and laws.77  
The primary focus of lawmakers around the world, when developing cyber 
laws, has largely been on criminalisation: creating new offences and penalties or 
adapting existing offences to address the broader challenges of cybercrime. The 
secondary objective has been to pronounce investigation and prosecution procedures 
following cyber incidents. 
The study of the various nations’ primary IT laws revealed that only South 
Africa’s ECT Amendment Act defined the term ‘cybercrime’. The analysis also 
uncovered that apart from India’s IT Act, none of the subject countries’ primary IT 
laws contained a definition for ‘cybersecurity’. Similarly, none of the reviewed IT 
76 F Kramer et al ‘Cyberpower and National Security’,2009 439. 
77  J Clough ‘A world of difference: The Budapest convention on cybercrime and the challenges of 
harmonisation’ (2014) 40 (3) Monash University Law Review 698.  
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laws of the subject nations contained definitions for ‘cyber-espionage’, ‘cyber-
terrorism’ and ‘cyber war’.  
 
 As already reported, India’s IT Act does not provide a definition for 
‘cybercrime’ and ‘cyber espionage’, nor does the US Code provide a definition for 
‘cyber espionage’. As alternates, India’s IT Act offers the following definitions for 
‘computer contaminant’ in the place of cybercrime and the term ‘protected systems’ 
for cyber espionage. The US Code defines ‘protected computer’ as an alternate term 
in the place of cyber espionage. 
 
 Where applicable, the IT laws specially drafted to combat cybercrimes, were 
also analysed for the definitions of cyber-criminal terminology. India and the UK 
exempted, none of the special cyber laws studied provided definitions for any of the 
terms in question. The special cyber laws all offered an alternate term for cyber 
espionage. South Africa’s CAC Bill defines ‘restricted computer system’ in the place 
of cyber espionage. Kenya’s Computer and Cybercrimes Act defines ‘protected 
computer system’ in the place of cyber espionage, where the US PATRIOT Act 
defines ‘protected computer’ as an alternative definition for cyber espionage  
 
 The search for legal definitions for cyber-criminal terminology extended to 
the national cybersecurity strategies and/or policies of the subject nations. In direct 
contrast to the primary IT laws and specialised cyber laws and owing largely to 
being more recent, most definitions were found therein. South Africa’s National 
Cybersecurity Policy Framework and the UK’s National Cyber Security Strategy 
both provide definitions for ‘cybercrime’, ‘cybersecurity’, ‘cyber espionage’ and 
‘cyber war’. Only the South African cybersecurity framework defines ‘cyber 
terrorism’. Kenya’s national cybersecurity strategy and India’s National Cyber 
Security Policy don’t provide any definitions for the cyber-criminal technology in 
question. The US does not have a national cybersecurity strategy and definitions are 
mainly defined at an agency level. For comparative purposes, the Department of 




 Whether it is necessary to define what cybercrime is and what it is not, is a 
domestic matter for nation states to resolve. Where the purpose of defining 
cybercrime is for investigating and prosecuting purposes, defining the activities that 
constitute cybercrimes may be more worthwhile, regardless of whether the crimes 
are considered real world crimes or cybercrimes in that jurisdiction. Conversely, 
where the purpose is to create distinction between acts of cybercrime and other 
malicious activities, it may then be worthwhile to define cybercrime and its 
expanding range of cyber threats at a policy level. Communicating a clear definition 
of cybercrime is essential for all stakeholders and various agencies involved.78 The 
lack of definitional clarity is problematic and retards prevention and remediation 
efforts.  
 
 As the body of literature grows and more jurisdictions provide definitions for 
cybercrime related terms, understanding and awareness of what constitutes 
cybercrime will also increase. 
 
                                               
78K Finklea and C Theohary ‘Cybecrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. Law Enforcement’ 
Congressional Research Services 2015, available at http://bit.ly/2m4DhDX accessed on 28 December 
2017.  
3. WHAT IS CYBERCRIME?  
The term ‘cybercrime’ has increasingly found its way into modern every day 
parlance with various meanings and interpretations attached to it. It has become a 
widely and loosely used term to refer to just about any criminal activity of an 
electronic nature that involves computing devices, electronic networks, the internet, 
and cyberspace. It is essential, for purposes of this dissertation, to define precisely 
what is meant and understood by this term, its origins, and its intended use within 
our context. Thus far, this dissertation has attempted to offer definitions for these key 
terms chapter two.  
Through the various definitions analysed, it is apparent that as it relates to 
cybercrime, ‘[t]he computer or device may be the agent of the crime, the facilitator 
of the crime, or the target of the crime.’1  This section will examine: the types of 
cybercrime; classifications of cybercrime; categories of cybercrime; the various 
forms of cybercrime; the perpetrators of cybercrime and what motivates them to 
commit act of cybercrime.  
 
3.1 Types of cybercrime 
Furnell2, Gordon and Ford3 classify cybercrime into two distinct groupings, namely 
those of a predominantly type I (also referred to as computer-focused) and type II 
(also referred to as computer-assisted) nature. Type I cybercrimes are almost entirely 
technological in nature. They are committed using computer-related and enabled 
technologies, they take place on computer-related and enabled platforms and rely 
primarily on computer-related and enabled technologies for their successful 
execution. Type II group of cybercrimes can be said to be more deceptive as they are 
almost always people-related. Although these types of crimes are committed using 
computer-related and enabled platforms and take place on computer-related and 
enabled platforms, their success is dependent on human frailty, susceptibility, and 
potential errors in judgements.  
                                               
1 Gordon & Ford op cit (n5) 14. 
2 M Ngafeeson (2009) 2. 




3.1.1  Type I cybercrimes  
These are computer-focused as they depend on the installation, modification, and/or 
manipulation of ‘crimeware’ which can be defined as malicious software designed to 
facilitate the commission of fraud, theft of personal information, from internet users, 
required to access, authorise or grant entry into programs and systems requiring valid 
identification and authentication for use. Malware is also written to perform 
unauthorised online transactions using the ill-gotten personal credentials and 
identities4. These cybercrimes generally exhibit the following characteristics: a once-
off, singular occurrence or discrete incident from the perspective of the victim; often 
facilitated through the introduction of ‘crimeware’ which may have been 
successfully installed onto the user’s computer systems a result of various 
vulnerabilities exploited by the perpetrator. Examples of this type of cybercrime 
include forms of phishing, theft or manipulation of data or services via hacking or 
viruses.  
Type I cybercrimes differ from Type II cybercrimes in that the kind of crimes that 
fall in this category come about as ‘a direct result of computer technology and there 
is no direct parallel in other factors.’5   
 
3.1.2  Type II cybercrimes 
These types of cybercrimes have a more pronounced human element and are said to 
be computer-assisted or computer-facilitated in nature. They are dependent on 
exploiting human frailties, momentary errors in judgement and play on the human 
psyche for their success. The perpetrators usually commit these crimes using 
legitimate, familiar, and frequently used computer programs (such as e-mail and 
web-browsers), to lure their unsuspecting victims. Forms of Type II cybercrimes 
                                               
4 M Nyamanga ‘A Layered Framework Approach to Mitigate Crimeware’ (2010) Annual ADFSL 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security, and Law. Available at 
http://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2010/thursday/7 accessed on 30 January 2018. 
5 W Hutchinson ‘Survival in the economy: 2nd Australian information warfare & security conference 
2001’ 2001, available at 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7758&context=ecuworks#page=38, 200.1, accessed 
on 8 November 2017.  
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include cyberstalking, cyber bullying, cyber harassment, child predation, extortion, 
and blackmail. In the case of Type II cybercrimes the underlying crime or offence 
either predates the emergence of computers or could be committed without them. 
Distinguishing between the two types of cybercrimes will not always be possible, 
nor precise. Not all cybercrimes will present themselves as being purely Type I or 
Type II in nature, they represent either end of a continuum.6 
 
3.2 Typology (Classification) of cybercrime 
Based on the object of legal protection and the method used to commit the crime, the 
2001 COE Convention on Cyber-crime lays down four criteria to be used for 
classifying cybercrimes. The convention’s section on substantive criminal law, lists 
them as follows:  
a. Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer 
data and systems; 
b. Computer-related offences; 
c. Content-related offences; 
d. Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights.  
The cybercrimes in the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the PATRIOT 
Act in the USA can, by deduction, be reasonably classified as those specified by the 
2001 European Convention on Cyber-Crime. The same can be said about South 
Africa’s ECT Act and CAC Bill.  
These classification of cybercrimes is also adopted and referenced within East 
Africa’s draft EAC legal framework for cyberlaws. Similarly, Article 29 of the 
African Union’s Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
identifies four classifications of cybercrime, referred to in the convention as offences 
specific to information and communication technologies:  
a. Attacks on computer systems;  
b. Computerised data breaches;  
c. Content related offences; and  
                                               
6 Gordon & Ford op cit (n5) 13. 
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d. Offences relating to electronic message security measures.7 
 
3.3 Categories of cybercrime   
Having classified cybercrimes, this section delves into the categorisation of these 
acts of cybercrime and their various forms and instances. There are, in general, four 
main categories of cybercrime that forms of cybercriminal activities may be 
categorised into.  
3.3.1 Cybercrimes against persons: 
This category of cybercrime involves cybercriminal attacks, through computers or 
computer networks, where the target of the attack is an identifiable individual or a 
group of persons. Examples of these crimes include insults8, harassment, acts of a 
racist and xenophobic nature9, assault by threatening10 through to cyber-defamation.  
 
3.3.2 Cybercrimes against property: 
This second category of cybercrimes is cyber-attacks that cybercriminals direct at the 
property belonging to a person and involve varying degrees of violation11 of, or, 
tampering with another’s property. These cybercrimes are also known as crimes 
affecting the economy. They range from cyber-vandalism and cyber-squatting 
through to computer related fraud. 
 
3.3.3 Cybercrimes against governments and/or organisations  
With this category of cybercrime, the attackers seek the critical information 
infrastructure and confidential military information of a country or the confidential 
mission-critical information that an organisation runs on. Crimes that make up this 
                                               
7 E Tamarkin ‘Cybercrime: A complex problem requiring a multi-faceted response’ Institute for 
Security Studies 2014, Available at, 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief51Feb14.pdf accessed on 10 April 2017. 
8 African Union Cybercrime Convention, Article 29(3)(1)(g) Date of Adoption 27 June 2014. Date of 
last signature 29 January 2018.  
9 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a 
racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems (ETS No. 189) Opening of the 
treaty, Strasbourg 28/01/2003. 
10 African Union Cybercrime Convention, Article 29(3)(1)(f). 
11 Ibid Article 30(1). 
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category are crimes such as cyber warfare, cyber espionage, industrial espionage, 
and cyber fraud. 
 
3.3.4 Cybercrimes against society: 
These unlawful acts of cybercrime are committed with the intention of causing harm 
to the broader society at large through using cyberspace to cause widespread harm, 
to disrupt societal balance and disharmonise the moral wellbeing of society. These 
offences include: possession and exchange of child pornographic materials, sale of 
illegal articles, illegal auctions on the internet and cyber terrorism.    
 
 
As technology evolves, so too do the cyber-attack vectors.12 By considering the 
following alternate categories of cybercrime, namely: ‘device spoofing, location 
manipulation, identity fraud, and threats or bots’13, newer forms of cybercrime and 
their interdependence and interconnectedness can be more accurately categorised. 
Table 3 below is inserted to illustrate the alternate categories and newer attack 
vectors and forms of cybercrime.     
 
                                               
12 R Hummel ‘Securing against the most common vectors of cyber-attacks ’2017 SANS Institute 
available at, https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/riskmanagement/securing-common-
vectors-cyber-attacks-37995, accessed on 04 December 2017. 
13 E Burns ‘Periodic table of cybercrime attacks: curing cybersecurity’s tunnel vision’2017, available 
at, https://www.cbronline.com/cybersecurity/business/periodic-table-cybercrime-attacks-curing-




Table 3: Alternate Cybercrime categories revised by attack vector . 
3.4 Forms of cybercrime 
3.4.1 COE Convention on Cybercrime.  
Most of the cybercrime legislation developed and adopted by countries between the 
years 2000 and 2010 were based on the traditional principles of substantive 
cybercrime and as defined by the COE Convention on cybercrime. This cybercrime 
legislation commonly outlaws the following acts of cybercrime and regards them as 
offences:   
a) illegal access;  
b) illegal interception;  
c) data interference;  
d) system interference;  
e) misuse of devices;  
f) computer forgery;  
g) computer fraud, and;  
h) offences related to child pornography.   
The convention, and subsequently the legislation that is based on it, does not address 
cater for the following new methods of cybercrime that must be covered by criminal 
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law, such as phishing, botnets, spam, identity theft, crime in social networks, internet 
of things, terrorist use of internet, and massive and coordinated cyber-attacks against 
information infrastructures.  
3.4.2 AU Convention on cyber security and personal data protection. 
Article 29 of the convention lists the following as cyber-criminal offences: 
a) Attack on computer system; 
b) Computerised Data Breaches;  
c) Content related offences;  
d) Offences relating to electronic message security; 
e) Property Offences.  
 
3.4.3 South Africa: Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 2017. 
The second chapter of the CAC Bill lists the following offences as acts of 
cybercrime: 
a) Unlawful securing of access;  
b) Unlawful acquiring of data; 
c) Unlawful acts in respect of software or hardware tool;  
d) Unlawful interference with data or computer program;  
e) Unlawful interference with a computer data storage medium or computer 
system;  
f) Unlawful acquisition, possession, provision, receipt or use of password, 
access codes or similar data or devices;  
g) Cyber fraud;  
h) Cyber forgery and uttering;  
i) Cyber extortion;  
j) Theft of incorporeal. 
 
3.4.4 Kenya: The Computer and Cybercrimes Bill 2017. 
a) Unauthorised access;  
b) Access with intent to commit further offence;  
c) Unauthorised interference; 
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d) Unauthorised interception;  
e) Illegal devices and access codes; 
f) Unauthorised disclosure of passwords or access code; 
g) Cyber espionage; 
h) False publications; 
i) Child pornography; 
j) Computer forgery; 
k) Computer fraud; 
l) Cyberstalking and cyber-bullying; and 
m) Offences committed through computer systems. 
 
 
3.5 Perpetrators of cybercrime:  
The word hacker has been around since the 1960s, initially used to describe well-
meaning and disciplined software and hardware experts. Lately, the term has taken 
on a more sinister and lessor constructive meaning and is used largely to refer to 
skilled computer experts who look to illegally gain access to systems and data.   
Although neither of the terms, ‘hacking’ nor ‘cracking’ are defined in South Africa’s 
ECT Act, its 2012 Amendment Bill, nor the CAC Bill of 2017, hacking can be 
described as unauthorised access to computers. The would-be perpetrator logs into a 
computer network, and gains entry to it without having the necessary authority to do 
so.14 In South African law, hacking and similar computer-enabled criminal activities 
performed to gain illegal access to a computer, network, or data, are explicitly 
prohibited and outlawed by s86 and s87 of the ECT Act15.  
There is still no universally accepted definition for hackers and those that are 
adopted and used in common speak are inconsistent. Having regard for the core 
elements of hacking, namely innovative use of technology, eagerness to exploit 
                                               
14 B Gordon ‘Internet Criminal Law’ Available at, 
http://www.legalnet.co.za/cyberlaw/cybertext/chapter15.htm, accessed on 08 November 2017 para 
426. 
15 Electronic and Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
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systems vulnerabilities, and programming, the following definition of hacking is 
recommended:  
An activity which encompasses computer programming, circumventing security 
systems designed to protect computer networks and digital data stores, designing, 
and executing solutions to solve problems by combining software and hardware in 
unconventional ways, and modifying and re-purposing digital products of all 
kinds.16 
 
3.5.1 Categories of hackers  
Hackers, whether a lone hacker or affiliated to a group, can generally be categorised 
into three main categories, distinguished by their motivation, their intent and 
observed values when carrying out their cyber-attacks or circumventing cyber 
defence parameters.  
White hats: This category of hackers are “ethical” hackers, driven by the need for 
good systems security. These individuals work within the laws of the hacker ethic (to 
do no harm), or as security experts. These are the so-called ‘good guys’ and are 
usually computer security experts or have extensive knowledge of that field.  
 
Grey hats: This term was coined by L0pht – one of the best known old-
school hacking groups. These hackers are reformed Black Hats, now working as 
security consultants. An alternate definition describes these hackers as those whose 
motives are unclear or may most likely change allegiance as they fall somewhere in 
between the White and Black hats. 
 
Black Hats: Power, anger or hate motivates these hackers. They do not have 
any qualms about stealing or destroying data from networks that they penetrate. 
Their object is to illegally obtain access into systems and perform malicious and 
                                               
16 R Madarie, ‘Hackers’ Motivations: Testing Schwartz’s Theory of Motivational Types of Values in 
a Sample of Hackers’ 11 (2017) International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 79.   
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criminal acts therein. These are the more sinister hackers who the term hacker 
generally applies to. 
 
3.5.2 Why cyber-attack perpetrators commit acts of cybercrime 
A study of cybercrime would not be complete without a cyber-criminal. To 
understand this calibre of criminal, it is essential to understand that, like many 
criminals who commit traditional crimes ‘the production of crime requires the 
presence of both motivated offenders and suitable targets (individuals or their 
property), in the absence of effective guardians’17. Successful combating and 
prevention of cybercrime relies heavily on understanding the profile and motivation 
of the perpetrator seeking to overcome cyber defences. This is known as 
psychological incident handling.18 
The driving and motivating factors that compel would-be perpetrators of 
cyber-attacks to carry out their illicit acts are complex, varied and not absolute. 
Various bodies of work were considered, but it was the 2001 hacker motivation table 
model19 developed by Furnell that was preferred ahead of that of Ngafeeson, 

















Challenge          
Ego          
Espionage          
Ideology          
Mischief          
                                               
17 M Ngafeeson ‘ Cybercrime Classification: A Motivational Model’, 2009, available at 
http://www.swdsi.org/swdsi2010/SW2010_Preceedings/papers/PA168.pdf accessed on 10 November 
2017. 
18 S Atkinson ‘Psychology and the hacker – Psychological Incident Handling’, 2015 available at 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/psychology-hacker-psychological-incident-
handling-36077 para 2 accessed on 10 November 2017. 
19 Hutchinson op cit (n5). 
20 Ngafeeson op cit (n17).  
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Money          
Revenge          
Table 4. Adaptation of Furnell’s - Hacker motivation table 
 
Having considered the driving values and factors that motivate cyber-attackers to 
carry out their cybercriminal activities, it is clear to see that there is seldom an 
attempted or completed cyber-attack without a motive. The following formula seeks 
to categorise and quantify the cost -versus -benefit decision evaluation 
considerations that a cyber-attack perpetrator will typically apply when deciding 
whether or not to proceed with a cyber-attack. For purposes of this dissertation, 
motive can be equated to a form of benefit in the following formula. 
CI = (BV * AL) – (DV * RL)  
‘The equation looks at Criminal Intent (CI) equals the attained likelihood (AL) of a 
benefit value (BV) minus the realization likelihood (RL) for the anticipated 
disadvantage value (DV).’21 
Graph 1 below, depicts how the hacker’s motives and sophistication are evolving 
over time as the world becomes more persistently and ubiquitously connected.   
                                               




 Graph 1: Evolving hacker motives22  
3.5.3 Industries most targeted by cyber-attack perpetrators   
A large extent of combating, preventing, or reducing the scourge of cybercrime in 
the digital era, has to do with understanding what it is that the cyber-criminals are 
after. Information is the lifeblood of nations, societies and organisations today. The 
format, reliance and value of the information may differ from country to individual 
to organisation but what is important to note is that not all the information will have 
the same value. Some will be deemed more important and useful than others. This is 
when the information becomes a critical asset and the organisation's ‘crown jewels’23 
that are highly sought after by very motivated and well-funded adversaries ranging 
from competitors, nation states, and organised crime groups.24 
 
                                               
22 Atkinson op cit (n18)  
23 The Information Security Forum defines “Crown Jewels” as information assets of greatest value 
and would cause major business impact if compromised.   
24Information Security Forum ‘Protecting the Crown Jewels’2016, available at 
https://www.securityforum.org/uploads/2016/09/ISF_Protecting-the-Crown-Jewels-Executive-
Summary-final.pdf accessed on 13 November 2017. 
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Personal information is the most sought after form of data. Incidents of identity theft 
are constantly rising (refer Table 5 below) from personally identifiable information, 
personal health information to personal finance information25. An assessment of the 
reported data breaches of the past three years indicates that the services and finance, 
insurance and real estate sectors26 suffered the most breaches and that the leading 
form of data breach is theft of data27.  
 
Table 5: 2016 Data Breaches28 
 
The following is a list of the most traded illegally obtained personal information 
artefacts in the criminal underground economy for 2016, thanks to publicly 
accessible underground forums and Dark Web Tor sites: 
1. Account details to access online entertainment and media platforms such as 
Netflix and Spotify;  
2. Restaurant gift cards information; 
3. Hotel bookings information; 
4. Airline frequent flyer programme information; 
5. Online banking account details; 
6. PayPal account details; 
7. Retail shopping accounts details (Amazon and Walmart); 
                                               
25 Symantec ‘2016 Internet Security Threat Report’, 2017, available at 
https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf, 46 accessed on 
18 November 2017. 
26 Ibid p48. 
27 Ibid p47. 
28 Ibid p45. 
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8. (Money laundering as a service) Illegal money transfer services, where inflated 
money transfers are made for nominal Bitcoin payments; and 
9. Credit cards details  
 
As at June 2017, more data had been lost or stolen in the first half of 2017 than in all 
of 2016. ‘In total, 1.9 billion records were compromised as of the end of June 2017, 
compared to 1.37 billion in 2016.’29 Table below illustrates this rise in breaches from 
2013-201730
 
The second half of 2017 also saw South Africa experience it’s largest data breach to 
date. It has been referred to as the Deeds-Master-Data-Breach and involved a breach 
of up to 66.3 million records of South African citizens’ personal information.  The 
latest assessment31 indicates that of these 66.3 million records, 57 million were 
related to people marked as ‘alive’ and 9.3 million to people marked as ‘deceased’. 
Worryingly, the data that was breached seems to indicate that the personal 
information of minors was also included.  
 
Hacker Motive Summary  
                                               
29 L Irwin ‘More data was lost or stolen in the first half of 2017 than all of 2016’ IT Governance 
Institute 2017, available at http://bit.ly/2EPoU1L, accessed on 13 November 2017. 
30 Gemalto ‘2017 First Half Breach Level Index’2017, available at 
http://breachlevelindex.com/assets/Breach-Level-Index-Report-H1-2017-Gemalto.pdf accessed on 13 
November 2017. 
31 T Hunt ‘Questions about the Massive South African "Master Deeds" Data Breach Answered’2017, 
available at https://www.troyhunt.com/questions-about-the-massive-south-african-master-deeds-data-
breach-answered/ accessed on 13 November 2017. 
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The following decision chart32 seeks to visually illustrate the process a cyber attacker 
typically follows before carrying out an attack and lists the considerations they 
would have to undertake before arriving at their ideal target by considering their 
motives, expertise and chosen target.  







Whether a target 
is pre-detrmined
Jurisdiction of the 
target
Category of the 
target




























Diagram 1: Hacker attack decision chart by expertise, motive, and target.
                                               
32 Kshteri op cit (n14) 45.  
 
3.6 Counting the cost of cybercrime   
Where there is a growing economy, bounds of capital infrastructure investments and 
a population explosion, cybercriminals are never far behind. They prey on 
developing countries where the risks presented by cybercrime are second to the need 
for connectivity and internet access. Typically, in nations such as these, the 
awareness to the threat of cyber risks ranges from low to non-existent due to the lax 
regulatory environment and low risk of prosecution. Cybercrime losses in the region 
have been on the rise as broadband connectivity increases. The lure of low-hanging 
fruits to be had explains the shift in cybercrime towards developing nations and 
emerging economies.   The fact that the internet is now ubiquitous and easily 
accessible, means that countries, organisations and citizens alike, will generate 
volumes of personal, corporate, national, and military data that organised crime 
bodies will be drawn to. These cybercriminal outfits will stop at nothing and spare 
no costs in their pursuit of personal data, money, and intellectual property. The 
impact of cyber-criminal activities on the global economy is believed to equal that of 
that of counterfeit goods or the narcotics trade.1 
 
According to the Norton Cybersecurity Insights Report of 20162 8.8 million 
South African’s fell victim to cybercrime that amounted to around R5.7 billion. In 
2014, South Africa had the most cyber-attacks in Africa3 and the centre for Strategic 
and International Studies4 estimates that 0.14% of the South African GDP was lost to 
cybercrime related activities. It is no wonder then that cybercrime statistics recently 
posted by the South African Banking Risk Information Centre5 report that South 
                                               
1 E Tamarkin, ‘The AU’s cybercrime response A positive start, but substantial challenges ahead’2015, 
available at, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief73_cybercrime.pdf accessed on 
19 April 2017. 
2 G Van Zyl ‘8.8 million South Africans hit by cybercrime - study’ 2016, available 
at,http://www.fin24.com/Tech/News/88-million-south-africans-hit-by-cyber-crime-study-20160707 
accessed on 01 August 2017. 
3 N Davids ‘SA is the leading target in Africa for cybercrime, warns legal firm’ 2017, available 
at,https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-02-13-sa-is-the-leading-target-in-africa-for-
cyber-crime-warns-legal-firm/ accessed on 01 August 2017.  
4 B O’Connor & V Moodley ‘The Growing Need For Cybercrime Insurance In South Africa’ 2016, 
available 
at,https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/export/sites/cdh/en/news/publications/2016/dispute/download
s/Dispute-Resolution-Alert-10-August-2016.pdf accessed on 07 November 2017. 
5 Pay U ‘SA companies under cyber-attack?’ 2015, available at, https://www.payu.co.za/press-
room/sa-companies-under-cyberattack accessed on 01 August 2017. 
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Africans lose in excess of R2.2 billion due to internet fraud and phishing attacks 
annually. ‘Forbes has estimated the combined spending on cyber security of just a 
few major banks (J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Citibank and Wells Fargo) was to 
the tune of US $500 billion in 2016.’6 In 2013, Kenya lost an estimated $36 million 
to cybercrime (0.05% of GDP), which rose to $150 million in 2015.  McAfee and the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported in 2014 that the annual cost 
to the global economy from cybercrime is more than [US]$445 billion.7  
 
Falling victim to cybercrime has become a real and costly threat to all so 
much so that business and consumers worry more about cybercrimes than about 
physical crimes.8 The now retired former US director of the National Security 
Agency, Keith B Alexander, referred to loss of industrial information and intellectual 
property through cyber espionage as ‘the greatest transfer of wealth in history.’9 
Even the most trusted system, once deemed impenetrable and totally secure, used to 
move trillions of dollars daily between banks (SWIFT) fell victim to cybercrime 
when one of its terminals10 was hacked and $81million was stolen from Bangladesh 
central bank.  
 
3.6.1 Analysing the cost of cybercrime  
 The phenomenon of cybercrime is new to most and still unfamiliar territory 
for many nations and industries. The details of how the cost and financial and/or 
fiscal impact of incidents of cybercrime is arrived at, is seldom disclosed, and/or 
                                               
6 India Ministry of Finance ‘Report of The Working Group For Setting Up of Computer Emergency 
Response Team In The Financial Sector (Cert-Fin)’ 2017, available at, 
http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Press-CERT-Fin%20Report.pdf accessed on 18 November 2017. 
7 McAfee ‘McAfee and CSIS: Stopping Cybercrime Can Positively Impact World Economies’ 2014 
available at, https://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2014/q2/20140609-01.aspx accessed 20 
November 2017. 
8 ThreatBrief ‘Consumers worry more about cybercrime than physical crime’ 2017, available 
at,http://threatbrief.com/consumers-worry-cybercrime-physical-crime/ accessed on 04 December 
2017. 
9 J Rogin ‘NSA Chief: Cybercrime constitutes the “greatest transfer of wealth in history’, 2012 
available at,http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief-cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-
transfer-of-wealth-in-history/ access on 04 December 2017.  
10 T Bergin ‘Costs of bank cyber thefts hit SWIFT profit last year’ 2017, available 
at,https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-banks-swift-cybercrime/costs-of-bank-cyber-thefts-hit-swift-profit-
last-year-idUKKBN1910FX accessed on 04 December 2017. 
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shared. This is largely because the methodologies and frameworks followed are still 
inconsistent, rudimentary, and ad hoc at best. Where organisations and countries 
have suffered from incidents of cybercrime, that data is seldom made public nor the 
details of what they considered when quantifying the impact and costs of the 
cybercrimes they have encountered. It is thus extremely difficult to arrive at a de 
facto and universally adopted framework or methodology without first concluding 
information sharing agreements, so that countries and/or organisations can develop 
their own bespoke models and algorithms to determine the actual or would be costs 
of incidents of cybercrime. Without industry/national data to model around and 
benchmark against, this is near impossible. It is for this reason that this dissertation 
will, through consideration of two different frameworks, determine how the cost of 
cybercrime is derived.   
 
Analysing the cost of cybercrime:  Model 1 - Academia    
 Driven by a desire to develop a framework that can be used to differentiate 
cybercrime costs from costs of other more traditional crimes and produce a more 
reliable, sound methodology that can be relied on for more accurate estimates of 
cybercrime losses using publicly available data, a team of information security 
economists from universities across the UK, Denmark, Netherlands, and the USA 
developed the ‘measuring the cost of cybecrime’ framework11 which is referred to as 
Model 1.  
Model 1 arrives at the cost or impact quantum of cybercrime by taking the following 
four categories and their components into consideration: 
1. Criminal revenue: Gross receipts from a crime, where criminal revenue may 
comprise: 
a. Money withdrawn from victim accounts; 
b. Revenue to spammer for sending phishing mails 
2. Direct losses: Losses, damage, or other suffering experienced by the victim 
as a consequence of a cybercrime. These may be: 
                                               
11 R Anderson et al ‘Measuring the cost of cybercrime’ 2012, available at, 
http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2012/presentation/Moore_presentation_WEIS2012.pdf, 
accessed on 04 December 2017. 
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a. Criminal revenue loss; 
b. Time and effort to reset account credentials;  
c. Secondary costs of overdrawn accounts (deferred purchases);  
d. Lost attention and bandwidth caused by spam messages; 
3. Indirect losses: losses and opportunity costs imposed on society as a result of 
an incident of cybercrime include: 
a. loss of trust in online banking;  
b. lost opportunity for banks to communicate via email;  
c. efforts to clean-up PCs infected with malware  
4. Defence costs: the costs associated with of preventing future incident of 
cybercrime 
a. security products (spam filters, antivirus);  
b. services for consumers (training) & industry (‘take-down’);  
c. fraud detection, tracking, and recuperation efforts;  
d. law enforcement costs 
   
Analysing the cost of cybercrime: Model 2 - Industry     
 Following up on the model developed by the Anderson and Moore, the 
Ponemon Institute and Accenture’s 2017 ‘Cost of cybercrime study’ framework (see 
Figure 1 below) will be considered as an alternate model to analysing and 
determining the cost of cybercrime. This model will be referred to as model 2. 
Unlike Model 1 which was develop using publicly available and published data of 
2010/11, this model was developed by conducting field-based research that involved 
interviews with senior industry personnel about actual cybercrime incidents in 2017.  
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Figure 1: Cost of Cybercrime Framework 
 
 
 Like Model 1 the dimensions considered by Model 2 are centred around 
determining the direct costs, indirect costs, and opportunity costs as a result of, and 
associated with an incident of cybercrime. Model 2 will also consider the internal 
and external costs to be incurred after an incident of cybercrime. The internal costs 
consist of the costs associated with the detection of the incident and end with the 
costs related to the final agreed upon response to the incident, which involves 
quantifying the costs of the lost business opportunities and the business disruption.  
 External costs comprise the loss of information assets, business disruption 
costs, extent of equipment damage and revenue loss as captured using shadow-
costing methods. Unlike model 1, model 2 assigns costs to the following discernible 
cyber-attack vectors12: viruses, worms, trojans; malware; botnets; web-based attacks; 
phishing and social engineering; malicious insiders; stolen or damaged devices; 
malicious code (including SQL injection); and denial of services. Figure 2 below 
refers. 
                                               
12 Accenture ‘Cost of Cyber Crime Framework’,2017 available at 
https://www.accenture.com/t20170926T072837Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-61/Accenture-2017-




Figure 2: Cost of cybercrime by attack type and country  
 
 The five internal cost activity centers to consider as per this framework are as 
follows costs of early detection, investigation and escalation, containment activities 
associated with stopping or reducing the extent of a cyber incident or the advanced 
threat thereof, repairing and remediating the organization’s systems and core 
business processes. These costs include the restoration of damaged information 
assets and other physical IT infrastructure assets. The costs of activities to help 
reduce the chances of a suffering from a similar cyber-attack in future are also borne 
in mind. They range from the costs of minimising business disruption and 
information loss, to future cybersecurity spend to enable newer technologies and 
strengthen controls systems.  
 In addition to the costs above, Model 2 also suggests consideration of the 
following external consequences or costs associated with the aftermath that sets after 
a successful cyber-attacks: 
a) Quantifying the value of the lost sensitive and confidential information, and 
the costs of notifying the relevant parties and authorities about the data 
breach and extent of information wrongfully acquired. 
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b) The costs to recover from business disruptions or unplanned outages that 
prevent the organisation from meeting its data processing requirements.  
c) Costs of restoring equipment and other IT assets, information resources and 
critical infrastructure.  
d) Overall value of revenue lost and damage caused due to system delays or 
shutdowns.  
 
 An exact understanding of cybercrime is necessary in the fight against this 
epidemic. It is vital to know the difference between types of cybercrime, the 
classifications of cybercrime and the various categories of cybercrime. Without this 
knowledge and understanding it will be nearly impossible to correctly classify cyber 
incidents, to criminalise the ever changing forms of cybercrime and to sufficiently 
empower parties tasked with investigating and prosecuting the incidents of 
cybercrime.  
 
 It is equally important to understand the role players in the cyber-criminal 
arena and the markets they service with their ill-gotten gains.  A definition of a 
hacker will go a long way in identifying common attributes and characteristics to be 
identified by. Understanding what motivates which cyber-attackers, their ideal 
targets, preferred attack conditions and their modus operandi is paramount to 
proactively thwarting their exploits or speedily resolving cyber-incidents.  The age 
old business adage commonly attributed to Peter Drucker, “If you can’t measure it, 
you can’t manage it” rings especially true in the fight against cybercrime. Details of 
breaches and incidents of cybercrime are seldom released and made public for peer 
corporations, nations, and members of the public to improve their safeguards against 
this threat. It becomes extremely difficult to establish which sectors or nations are 
most at risk without information sharing. It is thus essential that incidents be costed 
and reported against. This will not only improve cyber security awareness postures 
but will also reduce the chances of success for cyber-attacks. Another benefit of 
reporting incidents of cybercrime is that the data can be used to establish whether the 
battle against cybercrime is indeed being won or not . The more nations, corporations 
and citizens report their breaches and incidents the more accurate the cost impact 
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frameworks will be and the more reliable the threat indicators and cyber resilience 
strategies will become over time.     
 
4. SAFEGUARDING AGAINST CYBERCRIME  
 
The Institute of Risk Management defines ‘cyber risk’ as ‘any risk of financial loss, 
disruption, or damage to the reputation of an organisation from some sort of failure 
of its information technology systems’1. Chapters two and three have thus far 
established that the likelihood and probability of a cyber-attack does not only 
threaten private corporations and businesses but that countries and sovereign states 
are equally susceptible to the threat.  
 
4.1 Safeguarding the national critical information infrastructure from cyber risks  
 The government of Australia’s definition of critical infrastructure is most 
appropriate for this dissertation. It progressively defines critical infrastructure as  
‘[T]hose physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for 
an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic well-being 
of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure 
national security.’ 2 
 Systems, structures and physical places or areas that are of strategic interest 
to a country and are deemed vital to the country’s safety, security, and the wellbeing 
of its citizens, are known as critical infrastructure. Disruption of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure has the potential to undermine public safety, social order, and the 
fulfilment of key government responsibilities.3 Such damage would generally be 
catastrophic and far-reaching. Sources of critical infrastructure risk could be natural 
(ie earthquakes or floods) or man-made (ie terrorism or sabotage). 
 
                                               
1 Institute of Risk Management ‘Cyber risk and risk management’ 2018, available at, 
https://www.theirm.org/knowledge-and-resources/thought-leadership/cyber-risk/ accessed 13 
November 2017. 
2 The information sharing network ‘What is critical infrastructure?’ Australian National Security 
2018, available at, https://www.tisn.gov.au/Pages/Critical_infrastructure.aspx, accessed on 18 
November 2017. 
3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘Protection of ‘Critical 
Infrastructure’ And The Role Of Investment Policies Relating To National Security’2008, Available 
at,https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/40700392.pdf accessed on 18 November 2017. 
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 Critical information infrastructure is a subset of a country’s critical 
infrastructure that consists of vital interconnected information networks and systems 
that if disrupted or destroyed, the health, safety, security, and financial well-being of 
a country and the effective functioning of a government or economy would be 
severely hampered.4   
 
4.1.1 National Policies, Strategies and plans to protect critical information 
infrastructure  
 It is paramount for the effective running of a country that the critical 
infrastructure be protected against all possible known risks. To achieve this will 
require the countries to adopt a risk management approach towards protecting their 
critical infrastructure. This approach will ensure that governments identify their key 
security assets, assessing their exposure to associated risks and develop appropriate 
controls to mitigate the risks. Protection of a nations critical information 
infrastructures, using the risk management approach, will require prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery plans from the nations, their relevant agencies, 
and private sector operators of critical infrastructure facilities.5  
 
 When countries develop their national policy frameworks for critical 
infrastructure protection, they must ensure that the frameworks satisfactorily address 
all the major threats and ensure the coordination amongst all respondents (public and 
private, different levels of government and different sectoral responsibilities, diverse 
expertise). Countries should heed the UN General Assembly resolution 58/199 on 
the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection of critical 
information infrastructures, and other similar relevant resolutions, as they greatly 
assist with the development of strategies to secure national critical information 
infrastructure.6 
                                               
4 MN Njontini ‘Protecting Critical Databases – Towards a risk based assessment of critical 
information infrastructures in South Africa’ 2013(16) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 453. 
5 OECD op cit (n3) 2. 
6 P Paganini ‘G7 Declaration on responsible state behaviour in Cyberspace’, para 6-7 2017, available 
at http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/57932/cyber-warfare-2/g7-declaration-responsible-states-




4.1.2 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Structures: National 
Computer Security Incident Response team (nCSIRT) 
 In its 2015 report, the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security (UNGGE), encouraged states to establish a national Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT), a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) or 
to officially designate an organisation to fulfil this role. These response teams are 
often the primary national point of contact for cyber incident response as they are 
tasked by the nation’s cyber defence policy to issue alerts, warnings and to handle all 
matters relating to cyber threats and incidents, including the training of government 
constituents and cybersecurity stakeholders.7 
 
 National CSIRTs help coordinate cyber incident response at the national and 
international levels and are involved in devising and implementing national 
cybersecurity strategies. Their role is key in protecting the country’s government 
networks, critical information infrastructure and critical infrastructure networks and 
facilitating information sharing and dissemination with all relevant stakeholders. 
Some act as a default operational response team that national and international 
stakeholders can turn to, when there is no other known contact in a country. The way 
in which the national CSIRT’s are structured in terms of their authority, 
authorisation, functions and funding 8, varies by country. Some are positioned within 
governmental ministries, whilst others exist as non-governmental organisations or 
even independent governmental organisations. The ITU reported that in 2015 there 
were 102 countries that had either setup or formally recognised nCSIRTs.9 
 
4.1.3 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Structures: National 
cybersecurity centres  
                                               
7 India Ministry of Finance op cit (n6) 76.  
8 R Morgus et al ‘National CSIRTs and Their Role in Computer Security Incident Response’ 2015, 
available at http://bit.ly/2BDskCP accessed on 05 December 2017 5.  
9 Ibid, p8.  
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In line with the UN’s creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and the protection 
of critical information infrastructures resolution 58/199, countries are setting up 
dedicated national cybersecurity centres (NSCS) or network security agencies that 
will mainly host the national cyber security incident response teams (nCSIRT) and 
all role-players required for the collective defence of the nation’s cybersecurity. 




4.2 Protection of national critical information infrastructure arrangements – 
SOUTH AFRICA: 
  
4.2.1 National Strategy, Policy, and Regulatory Framework    
The South African government has put in place the following policies for the 
safeguarding of it’s critical information infrastructure:  
i. South African Cybersecurity Policy;  
ii. National e-Strategy; and 
iii. National Cybersecurity Policy Framework as per Gazette No.39475 of 
December 2015 
 
The safeguarding of critical information infrastructure is protected in law as codified 
in the following proposed and enshrined laws:  
i. Section198 & s210 Constitution of RSA Act 108 of 1996;  
ii. Section 17 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Bill 2016 –powers and 
duties of persons in control of critical infrastructure; 
iii. Section 20,57 &58 Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill 2017;  
iv. Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002; 
v. Section 53 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002;  
vi. Financial Intelligence Act 38 of 2001; 
vii. Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication related 
Information Act, 2002;  
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viii. National Key Point Act 102 of 1980; 
ix. National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994; 
x. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 97 of 1993; 
xi. Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act, 2004; and  
xii. Trespass Act 6 of 1959. 
 
4.2.2 National Critical Information Infrastructure Security Structures    
The following structures and arrangements in relation to the creation and operation 
of national critical information infrastructure structures for the South African 
government are in place: 
i. Critical Infrastructure Council – as proposed by section 4 of the CIP Bill 
ii. Cyber Response Committee – as proposed by section 53 of 2017 CAC Bill 
iii. Cyber Security Centre – as proposed by per section 12(8) of CIP Bill  
iv. Cyber Security Hub – as proposed by section54 of Cybercrimes Bill  
v. The Electronics Communications Security – Computer Security Incident 
Response Team (ECS-CSIRT) – established by the State Security Agency in 
2003 
vi. National Computer Security Incident Response Teams - as proposed by 
section 52 of Cybercrimes Bill 
vii. Private sector Computer Security Incident Response Teams - as proposed by 
section 55 of Cybercrimes Bill 
 
4.3 Protection of national critical information infrastructure arrangements - 
KENYA: 
4.3.1 National Strategy, Policy, and Regulatory Framework    
The government of Kenya has the following strategy and policy framework in place 
for the protection of its national critical information infrastructure against the threat 
of cybercrime:  
i. Kenya Vision 2030;  
ii. National Cybersecurity Strategy, 2014;   
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iii. National Cybersecurity Masterplan; 
iv. National Cybersecurity Framework, 2014; 
v. National Certification Authority Framework; 
vi. National Public Key Infrastructure Policy; 
vii. Kenyan Information and Communications Technology Policy, 2006  
 
The safeguarding of Kenya’s critical information infrastructure is protected in law as 
codified in the following proposed and enshrined laws:  
i. Information and Communications Act 2013; 
ii. Kenya’s National Security Intelligence Service Act 11 of 1998; 
iii. Cybersecurity and Protection Bill 2016; 
iv. Computer and Cybercrimes Bill 2016; 
v. Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill; 
vi. Data Protection Bill 2015; 
vii. Finance Bill 2016.  
 
4.3.2 National Critical Information Infrastructure Security Structures  
The structures responsible for the cyber security and effective operation of Kenya’s 
national critical information infrastructure structures are: 
i. Communications Authority of Kenya; 
ii. Kenya ICT Authority; 
iii. National Security Council; 
iv. The Kenya Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT-Kenya);  
v. National Computer Incident Response Team Coordination Centre (KE-
CIRT/CC); 
 
4.4 Protection of national critical information infrastructure arrangements – 
USA:  
The USA has installed the following strategy, policy and regulatory frameworks 
have been installed to ensure the protection of national critical information 
infrastructure from cybercrimes:  
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4.4.1 National Strategy, Policy, and Regulatory Framework    
i. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986;  
ii. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015; 
iii. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001;  
iv. Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002;  
v. Cyber Research and Development Act of 2002;  
vi. Homeland Securities Act of 2002; 
vii. Federal Advisory Committee Act; 
viii. Executive Order (EO) 1363610 Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity;  
ix. Presidential Policy directive (PPD) – 21;  
x. Presidential Policy directive (PPD) – 24; 
xi. Presidential Policy directive (PPD) – 41; 
xii. National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996; 
xiii. National Infrastructure Protection Plan11 : Partnering for Critical 
Infrastructure Security and resilience;   
xiv. The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets; 
xv. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity; 
 
 
4.4.2 National Critical Information Infrastructure Security Structures 
It is from within the following structures and arrangements that the national critical 
information infrastructure of the US is situated and operated: 
i. National Operations Center 
ii. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) 
a. US Cyber Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) 
b. Industrial Control Systems CERT 
                                               
10 ‘Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Executive Order 13636’ 2013, available at, 
http://www.cyberriskinsuranceforum.com/sites/default/files/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf 
accessed on 14 November 2017. 
11 ‘National Infrastructure Protection Plan’ Department of Homeland Security 2017, available at, 
https://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan accessed on 14 November 2017.  
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iii. Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program (C³VP) 
iv. National Infrastructure Coordinating Center 
 
4.5 Protection of national critical information infrastructure arrangements – 
UNITED KINGDOM: 
To safeguard the national critical information infrastructure of the UK from cyber 
risks, the following strategy, policy, and regulatory frameworks have been 
developed:  
4.5.1 National Strategy, Policy, and Regulatory Framework  
Strategies and Policies 
i. Counter Terrorism Strategy 
ii. National Security strategy 
iii. National Cyber Security Strategy 
iv. National Risk Register  
v. Financial Conduct Authority - CBEST Vulnerability Testing Framework 
 
Legislation 
i. Emergency Powers Act of 1920 
ii. Computer Misuse Act of 1990 
iii. Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 
iv. Communications Act 2003 
v. Security Services Act of 1989 
Directives 
i. The Network and Information Security Directive (NIS Directive) 
ii. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
iii. Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD 2) 
 
4.5.2 National Critical Information Infrastructure Security Structures 
It is from within the following structures and arrangements that the national critical 
information infrastructure of the UK is situated and operated: 
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i. National Cyber Security Centre 
ii. Centre for the protection of National Infrastructure 
 
4.6 Protection of national critical information infrastructure arrangements - 
INDIA 
Efforts to protect India’s national critical information infrastructure from 
cybercrimes are captured in the following strategy, policy, and regulatory 
frameworks:  
4.6.1 National Strategy, Policy, and Regulatory Framework  
Legislation 
 
i. Information Technology Act 2000  
ii. IT Amendment Act 2008 
iii. The Data (Privacy and Protection) Bill, 2017 
 
Strategies and Policies 
i. National Cyber Security Policy 2013 
ii. National Information Security Policy & Guidelines 2013  
iii. Security and Privacy framework for Smart Cities 2016 
iv. State Cyber Security Policies - Telangana and AP 2016   
v. Guidelines for the protection of National Critical Information Infrastructure  
 
4.6.2  National Critical Information Infrastructure Security Structures 
The following structures and authorities are responsible for the protection of India’s 
national critical information infrastructure from cybercrimes: 
i. National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) 
ii. National Security Council (NSC) 




4.7 Safeguarding corporate mission critical information assets from cyber risks  
4.7.1 Definition of Cyber Risks: 
Having defined cyber risks from a point of view of nation states and their duty to 
protect their country’s critical information infrastructure, the term is now defined for 
boards of directors and those entrusted with the duty of protecting a company’s 
mission critical information assets from cybercrime. ‘Cyber risk’ is defined as ‘the 
operational risk to information and technology assets that may affect the 
confidentiality, availability, or integrity of information or information systems.’12 
The incidents of cyber risks range from unauthorised access to the use or disclosure 
of regulated, protected or sensitive data.13 Cyber risks may be categorised into four 
classes: 1) actions of people, 2) systems and technology failures, 3) failed internal 
processes, and 4) external events.14 
 
 An organisation that suffers a cyber risk incident may find itself liable for the 
costs and penalties associated with business disruption, financial loss, loss to 
stakeholder value, reputational harm, trade secret disclosure, competitive harm, legal 
non-compliance liability and civil liability to customers, business partners and other 
persons. 
 
 Despite the rise in reporting of high profile incidents of cyber risks around 
the world, directors remain uninformed about cyber risk management and their cyber 
risk responsibilities towards their companies. Studies in the UK reveal that only 5% 
of company boards regularly and thoroughly review their key information and data 
assets. Whilst only 1% are said to be fully informed and skilled in respect of cyber 
security.15 Cyber risk events can halt operations, expose critical intellectual property, 
                                               
12 C Biener et al ‘Insurability of Cyber Risks: An empirical analysis’ (2015) Institute of Insurance 
Economics available at http://bit.ly/2FeD6if accessed on 28 December 2017 4. 
13 B Gervais ‘Cyber Risk Management Guidance for Corporate Directors’, 2017 available at, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=800d6480-500a-424d-839f-68879eb98637 accessed 
on 16 November 2017. 
14 Biener op cit (n12) 4. 
15 F Flockhart ‘Cyber risk and directors' liabilities: an international perspective’ 2016, Norton Rose 
Fulbright available at, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/145122/cyber-
risk-and-directors-liabilities-an-international-perspective accessed on 16 November 2017. 
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and adversely affect the reputation of a company and its board. Furthermore, equity 
funds and companies considering acquisition and investment now take cyber 
preparedness into consideration, and a lack of planning can impact a company’s 
value and potential sale price. 
 
Duties of directors16 are to be found in a company’s memorandum of incorporation, 
the common law, codes of practice, and the Company’s Act and other statues.  
These duties owed to the company by the directors, as imposed by the common law 
are a fiduciary duty, requiring reasonable care skill and diligence.  
A fiduciary duty simply means that a director of a company must exercise the 
powers and perform the functions of director in good faith and in the best interest or 
benefit of the company.17 The director owes the duty to the company itself and not to 
shareholders or other stakeholders, and fault is not required to prove breach of duty. 
There are four fundamental fiduciary duties of director in common law. These are 
that directors may not (a) exceed their powers; (b) exercise their powers for an 
improper or collateral purpose; (c) fetter their discretion; or (d) place themselves in 
a position in which their personal interests conflict with their duties to the 
company.18  
Where a director is in breach of a fiduciary duty, the company can remedy the breach 
through restitution to the company for the loss suffered by the company or the 
benefit gained by the director.19 
 
 Similarly, section 76 of the Company’s Act requires a fiduciary duty, and a 
duty of reasonable care from directors. These are not all the duties expected of 
directors by the Companies Act but are the most applicable to the scope of this 
                                               
16 Director means any member of the board of a company, as contemplated is s66 or an alternate 
director of a company and includes any person occupying the position of a director or alternate 
director, by whatever name delegated, as defined in s1 Companies Act.   
17 W Geach ‘Statutory, Common Law And Other Duties Of Directors’ Available at 
https://www.chartsec.co.za/documents/speakerPres/WalterGeach/GeachStatutoryCommonLawAndOt
herDutiesOfDirectors.pdf , 2009, accessed on 11 February 2018. 
18 Duties of Directors and Officers Fiduciary Duties (4) SALJ 2 
19 N Bouwman ‘An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill’ 4 SA 
Mercantile Law Journal 21 (2009) 510-511. 
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dissertation. The directorial duties pertaining to conflict of interest (s75) and 
indemnities and insurance (s78) will not be discussed further. The duties regarding 
directors’ liability (s77) will be discussed in later sections to follow.  
 
The key functions of a governing body, according to the King IV Code20 are 1.) to 
steer the organisation and set its strategic direction; 2.) to approve policy and 
planning that give effect to the set strategy and direction; 3.) to oversee and monitor 
implementation and execution by management and 4.) to ensure that there is 
accountability for organisational performance.  
 
4.7.2 Common law duty of care 
 The common law duty of care requires directors to act with the required 
degree of care and skill. The standard of ‘care’ and ‘skill’ is not prescribed in the 
common law. Establishing that a director acted with required ‘care’ can to some 
degree be proven objectively whereas establishing the discharge of the required 
‘skill’ will vary   depending on the nature of the business, obligations assigned, and 
if they are an executive or a non-executive director. Directors are expected to 
exercise the care that can reasonably be expected of a person with their knowledge or 
expertise and as such are justified in trusting and rely on the judgment, information, 
and advice of management, provided due consideration was given to the information 
and their own judgment applied accordingly.21  
 In Terms of s6022 of the Banks Act of 199023 and the banking regulations24, 
the directors of a bank owe a greater duty of skill and care than that owed, under the 
                                               
20 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IODSA) ‘King IV Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa’ (2016) 21. 
21 Bouwman op cit (n19) 510-511.  
22S60 Banking Act "fiduciary relationship" must be interpreted as acting in the "best interests and for 
the benefit of the bank and its depositors". 
23 The Banks Act 4 of 1990.  
24 The Banks Regulations (published in Government Gazette no. 21726 of 8 November 2000. 
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common law, by the directors of other companies. The fiduciary duty and duty of 
skill and care owed by the directors of a bank is also owed to its depositors.25 
Where a director is charged with a breach of the common law duty of care in 
the discharge of his duties, the company’s cause of in delict. This action requires the 
company to satisfactorily establish the existence of the following elements of delict: 
conduct (can either be an act or an omission), wrongfulness, fault (in the form of 
intent or negligence), causal connection between the wrongful act or omission and 
the damage suffered, and the resulting loss or damage suffered because of the 
conduct of the director. The remedy for breach of the duty of care is delictual 
damages recoverable by the company and not based on restitution in integrum. 26 
4.7.3 Duty to discharge the duty of care and skill 
Section 76(3) of the Companies Act of 2008 partially codifies the common 
law duty of care and skill and in so doing leaves room for the common law to still be 
developed further and even apply to matters not foreseen by drafters at time of 
codification.  Determining a breach of duty of skill and care has come a long way 
from the lenient approach under the common law that relied on subjectively proving 
the director’s intelligence and experience. The shortfall of this test was that nothing 
less than the most gross or negligence would lead to a finding that a director was in 
breach of his duties. This test has since been revised to be inclusive of both the 
objective and subjective elements to suit the partially codified dispensation.27    
Section 77(2)(a) of the Act state that a director of a company may be held 
liable (in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to the breach of 
a fiduciary duty) for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company due to a 
25 C Tucker ‘Greater duty of skill by the directors of a bank’ 2003, available at 
http://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/greater-duty-of-skill-by-the-directors-of-a-bank/, accessed on 
12 February 2018. 
26Ibid.  
27 Bouwman op cit (n19) 532. 
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consequence of any breach by the director of the duties contemplated, inter alia, in 
s76.  
Similarly, section 77(2)(b) Act28 provides that a director of a company may 
be held liable based on common law principles relating to delict for any losses or 
damages which the company may suffer due to a breach of the duty of care and skill 
in terms of s76(3)(c), losses due to a breach of a provision of the Act not mentioned 
in s77 and losses due to the contravention of any provisions of the memorandum of 
incorporation (MoI) of the company.29 
The basis of the liability of a director to the company for injuries suffered to 
its interests, listed in s77(3)(a)- (e) in some instances combine consequences for 
violations of both a fiduciary duty and a duty of care, skill, and diligence. South 
African law allows the same facts to give rise to a claim for damages in delict as well 
as in contract and allows the plaintiff to choose which to pursue. 30This is known as a 
concursus actionum which only exists where the independent requirements of both a 
contractual and a delictual action are present. In the case of Loureiro v iMvula 
Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd31 the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld both 
claims in contract and delict holding that the defendant had acted negligently and 
wrongfully in a delictual sense.32  
These cyber risk management duties of the board may also stem from stock 
exchange listing requirements, industry regulators, self-regulatory organisations or 
even codes of practice. Where the views expressed by regulators, organisations and 
associations might not have the force of law, they may be relied on by courts in 
determining the standard of reasonable care, skill and diligence required of corporate 
28 S76 -77, Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
29 R Stevens ‘The legal nature of the duty of care and skill’: Contract or Delict’, 2016, 19 PER 42. 
30 B Mupangavanhu 2016 ‘Directors’ Standards of Care, Skill, Diligence, And The Business 
Judgment Rule In View of South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008: Future Implications For 
Corporate Governance’ 192. 
31 Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (PTY) Ltd 2014 3 SA 394 (CC).  
32 A Price ‘The contract/delict interface in the Constitutional Court’ 2014 25 Stellenbosch Law Review 
501.
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directors regarding the management of a corporation's cyber risk. Similarly, the King 
IV Code on Corporate Governance charges the governing body ‘to govern risk in a 
way that supports the organisation in setting and achieving its strategic objectives’33 
and to oversee that the ‘integration of technology and information risks into 
organisation-wide risk management.’34  
4.7.4 Consequences of breach of duty of care by directors 
The scope of this discussion on the consequence that may befall a director 
found to have breached their duty of care and skill in terms of the Companies Act 
does not include discussions of penalties applicable to a director of a company that is 
insolvent, entering business rescue or that was liquidated.   
Directors of a company may be removed, statutorily, by shareholders, directors, and 
other parties catered for in law and/or the company’s memorandum of incorporation 
(MOI)35 such as the Companies Tribunal (Tribunal). 
Section 71(1) allows for company directors elected to the board and found to 
have failed in their discharge of the duty of care and skill to be removed. Their 
removal may be by way of an ordinary resolution of shareholders in a general 
meeting. Ex-officio directors can only be removed by the board or the Companies 
Tribunal (Tribunal) provided they were given prior notice of the meeting and an 
opportunity to make representations.36 A director may also be removed at the 
insistence of directors according to s71(3). The allegations against him must satisfy 
the board. 
33 IODSA (n20) Principle 10.  
34 Ibid, Principle 12. 
35 ‘Removing a Director Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 2015, available at, 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/removing-a-director-under-the-companies-act-71-of-2008-2015-06-
30, accessed on 11 February 2018. 
36 S71(2) of Companies Act. 
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Directors who have been appointed to the board by specific persons, can only 
be removed only by those persons, the board or the Tribunal37. Shareholder-
appointed directors can be removed by the shareholders, the board, or the Tribunal. 
s71(8) provides that Tribunal removals are available only where the board consists of 
‘less than three members’, whilst s71(3) provides that board removals are available 
only where the board has more than two members.38  
Removal of directors at the instance of directors or a shareholder alleging 
ineligibility or disqualification39 in terms of s69, may take place where the grounds 
for disqualification are a court order prohibiting a person from being a director or a 
declaration that they are delinquent as per s162. In the case of 
Msimang NO and another v Katuliiba and others40 and that of 
Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Druker and others41, the courts confirmed the 
requirements for directors to be declared delinquent as contemplated in section 162 
(5)(c)(iv)(aa). Furthermore, the court held in the case of Kukama v Lobela and 
Others42 that once a director has been declared a delinquent the court does not have 
to order their removal, it follows automatically. Other grounds for removal due to 
insistence of directors or a shareholder are, inability to perform a director’s 
functions, negligence (determined using s76) or dereliction of duties.43 
Although the plaintiff faces high costs and difficulty in accessing to company 
information required to support the claim44, a derivative action is one of the ways a 
shareholder, or a person listed in s165(2) of the Act, may redress the wrongs 
committed against the company when those in control of the company refuse to do 
37 Ibid at Section 66(4)(a)(i). 
38 C Ncube ‘You’re Fired! The removal of directors under the Company Act 71 of 2008’ SALJ (2014) 
39. 
39 S71(3)(a)(i) Companies Act. 
40 Msimang NO and another v Katuliiba and others [2013] JOL 30522 (GSJ). 
41 Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Druker and others [2016] JOL 36987 (WCC). 
42 Kukama v Lobelo and Others (38587/2011) [2012] ZAGPJHC 60. 
43 Ncube op cit (n38) 39. 
44 MF Cassim ‘The statutory derivative action under the Companies Act of 2008: 
Guidelines for the exercise of the judicial discretion’ (2014) available at 
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/13147/thesis_hum_2014_cassim_mf.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 
on 12 February 2018. 
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so. It also acts as a deterrent for directors not to abuse their duties to the detriment of 
a company. Public enforcement is a remedy for a person without the financial means 
a claim that can be used to bring the claim by a person without the financial means to 
access the courts and to secure access the required company information.45 
For a derivative action, a minority shareholder/s or other stakeholder/s must 
serve a demand on a company. The case of Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises (Pty) 
Ltd and another46 held that any legally recognisable manner of service of any court 
process or document initiating proceedings shall be adequate service. 
If the company does not challenge the demand or when the court does not set 
aside the demand, the company must appoint an independent person or committee to 
investigate the demand. Within 60 days of being served, the company must either 
initiate or continue legal proceedings, protect the legal interests of the company as 
contemplated in the demand, or serve a notice on the person who made the demand, 
refusing to comply with it.47 
The court will thereafter exercise its discretion as per s165(5) to grant the person 
who served the demand the right to institute or continue legal proceedings.  
Removal of directors by the Companies Tribunal as per s71(8) are restricted to 
companies which have between one and three directors. Any shareholder or director 
may apply to the Tribunal to decide whether a director should be removed on the 
grounds listed in s71(3).48 
45 Ibid 190. 
46 Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises (Pty) Ltd & Another (10442/2011) [2012] ZAKZDHC. 
47 S Stadler & R Kok ‘Protecting your rights as a minority shareholder in South Africa: The derivative 
action’(2015) available at http://www.puleinc.co.za/publications/protecting-your-rights-as-a-
minority-shareholder-in-south-africa-the-derivative-action/, accessed on 12 February 2018. 
48 Ibid 44. 
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Criminal proceedings may be instituted against a company as per s332(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act49. A company can be prosecuted for any common law 
offence. This section ‘caters for all types of criminal activities by corporations, 
including those that require mens rea in the form of negligence’50, and it makes 
provision for acts or omissions instructed by a director or servant of that corporate 
body during the performance of their duties to further the interests of the corporate 
body. The act or omission is deemed to be performed by the corporate body and no 
intent is required.  
4.7.5 Defences and remedies available to directors charged with breach of duty 
of care: 
A director who is removed from office in terms of s71, by a board or the 
Tribunal, or person who had directly appointed him to the board, has 20 business 
days to take the matter on court on review. Any director who voted in favour of the 
resolution to remove or retain a director concerned, or any shareholder who has 
voting rights in the election of that director, can also bring matter to court on 
‘review’. 
A director who has a fixed term appointment but is removed from office by 
an ordinary resolution of the shareholders before the expiry of that term and has not 
given the company cause to terminate the contract, may have a claim for damages 
against the company for breach of contract.  As an executive director may resign 
from a directorship but still retain employment by the company a simultaneous 
termination of that director’s employment would constitute a dismissal. In cases of 
unfair dismissal, the most appropriate remedy is usually an award of damages as the 
courts have stated that the remedy of reinstatement is unlikely to be granted.51 
49 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
50 DM Farisani ‘Corporate Criminal Liability for Deaths, Injuries and Illnesses: Is South Africa’s 
Mining Sector Ready for Change?’ 2015 available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Corporate-Criminal-Liability-for-Deaths-Injuries-and-IllnessArticleby-DM-
Farisani.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2018. 
51 Ncube op cit (n38) 46-48.  
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Section 77(9) states that in any proceedings against a director, other than for 
wilful misconduct or wilful breach of trust, the court may relieve the director, either 
wholly or in part, from any liability, if it appears to the court that the director has 
acted honestly and reasonably.52 
The business judgement rule (BJR) has been codified into South African law 
as per s76(4) of the Act. This rule, of American origin, states that an officer or 
director of a corporation is not liable for acts of mere negligence as the court will not 
interfere with the business judgement of directors where fraud, bad faith or lack of 
care is absent. However, the interpretation and application of this rule has not been 
tested by the courts.53 The BJR thus seeks to ensure that decisions made by directors, 
provided they meet set criteria, are protected even though, the decisions prove to be 
erroneous. Courts have long maintained that ‘directors may exercise their discretion 
bona fide in what they consider not what a court may consider is in the interests of 
the company.’54 
In the event of a derivative action, s165 (3) provides that when a demand is 
served on the company, the company has 15 business days to apply to court to have 
the demand set aside on the basis that the demand is frivolous, vexatious or without 
merit.  
A company is entitled to take out indemnity insurance to protect a director 
(barring the situation where the director is convicted of an offence or the director 
acted in the name of the company and signed on behalf of the company and 
52 ‘Directors liability Booklet’ Werksmans Attorneys 2013, available at, 
https://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Werksmans-Directors-Liability-Booklet.pdf 
, accessed on 12 February 2018. 
53 H Stoop ‘The business judgment rule: how the Companies Act of 2008 is impacting on directors’ 
duties’2012 129(3) SALJ 547. 
54 B Mupangavanhu 2016 ‘Directors’ Standards of Care, Skill, Diligence, And The Business 
Judgment Rule in View of South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008: Future Implications For 
Corporate Governance’ 58. 
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purported to bind the company without the necessary authority). The company may 
also indemnify itself against expenses advanced to a director in terms of such 
indemnity and accordingly, in terms of s78, indemnity also applies to former 
directors of the company and allows for restitution claims from directors.55 
Cyber Risk Management Duty: Analysis by country. 
The question being addressed by the table below is whether there exists a fiduciary 
duty, at director level to manage the cyber risks of a company and if directors may 
face liability from a failure to discharge such a duty according to the various 
company and IT laws, sector regulations and exchange requirements of the subject 












































55 W Smit ‘Companies Act 2008 – Directors’ Responsibilities and Liability’ 2011 available at 
https://www.exceedinc.co.za/news/companies-act-2008-directors-responsibilities-and-
liability/?id=8&entryId=13, accessed on 12 February 2018. 
56 ‘CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2’, U.S. Security and Exchange Commission 2011, available 
at, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm accessed on 16 November 
2017. 
57 ‘Cybersecurity, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’2015, available at, 
http://www.finra.org/industry/cybersecurity, accessed on 20 November 2017. 
58 R Frierson, ‘Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
and Homeland Security’ 2017, available at, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2017/May/20170518/R-1550/R-
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59 ‘Financial Institutions Examination Council’ 2017, Available at, https://www.ffiec.gov/ accessed on 
16 November 2017. 
60 ‘Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards’ Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council 
2017 Available at, https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2017/February/20170221/R-1550/R-
1550_021717_131709_429070260162_1.pdf accessed on 13 December 2017. 
61 MT Vullo ‘Cybersecurity Requirements For Financial Services Companies’ New York Department 
of Financial Services 2017, available 
at,http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf accessed on 16 November 2017. 
62 ‘ICO fines Sony £250,000 for failure to prevent hacking on Sony PlayStation Network Platform, by 
PLC IPIT & Communications’, 2013 available at, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-523-
7306?originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&co
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http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/New-cyber-crime-rule-for-commercial-banks/539546-
3981762-12c4in7/index.html , accessed on 21 November 2017. 

























FSDC - (s14(1)) –
IRDA Act
- (s43A) – IT
Act 2000











An analysis of the subject nations IT laws and sectoral regulations regarding 
directors’ duties and management of cyber risks, mainly data breaches, indicates that 
all the nations analysed have legislated the fiduciary duty for directors to manage 
their organisations cyber risks with the required reasonable care and skill. This duty 
of care extends to directors in all jurisdictions69, except India, to disclose after 
occurrences of a data breach. In the case of India, the duty to disclose after a data 
breach is limited to and only regulated within the financial services, banking, and the 
insurance sectors. Provisions to hold directors liable after data breaches and similar 
instances where they failed to manage cyber risks, are available in the legislation of 
all countries studied. These range from securities class actions to derivative actions 
and common law liability. Despite having codified legislation to compel directors to 
manage cyber risks with all due care, very few nations have case law to this effect, 
where directors were prosecuted for breach of duty of care and skill over the 
65 The Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal 
Data or Information) Rules 2011. 
67 Kerala High Court, C.M Philip vs The Registrar of Co-Operative, 2013, available at, 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16257664/ accessed on 5 December 2017. 
68 Developing case involving mobile money platform and all banks in India, October 2017, available 
at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/mobikwik-glitch-cops-track-those-who-
transferred-funds/articleshow/60898149.cms accessed on 5 December 2017. 
69 Once fully enacted and in force, section 22 of the Protection of Information Act will require that the 
information regulator in South Africa, be notified of breaches involving personal information. 
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management of a company’s cyber risks. It is only the USA and the UK where this 
precedent exists.   
4.7.6 Board cyber risk oversight duties: 
Discussed below are a set of recommended cyber risk duties for boards of 
directors to consider, as framed by leading scholars70 of enterprise risk management: 
Directors should, through their risk oversight role, satisfy themselves that the 
risk management policies and procedures designed and implemented by the 
company’s senior executives, and risk managers, are consistent with the company’s 
strategy and risk appetite; that these policies and procedures are functioning as 
directed; and that necessary steps are taken to foster an enterprise-wide culture that 
supports appropriate risk awareness, behaviours and judgments about risk and 
recognises and appropriately escalates and addresses risk-taking beyond the 
company’s determined risk appetite.  
The board should be aware of the type and magnitude of the company’s 
principal risks and should require that the CEO and the senior executives be fully 
engaged in risk management.  
The board should regularly review court decisions, regulations, and keep 
abreast of industry standards and best practices. Boards must hold frequent meetings 
to analyse cyber risks and develop potential mitigating plans of actions. They should 
create or appoint a committee to review cyber issues and/or investigate data incidents 
and breaches. Boards must work with risk management to implement a monitoring, 
compliance, and risk management programme, oversee the execution of the 
programme, and investigate possible violations.71 
Through its oversight role, the board can send a message to management and 
employees that comprehensive risk management is not an impediment to the conduct 
70 Lipton M, ‘Risk Management and the Board of Directors’, Harvard Law School, 2017 available at, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/15/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-4/ 
accessed on 02 November 2017.  
71 R Sarkar ‘Four Key Cyber Risk Management Questions for Directors and Officers’ 2017, available 
at, http://www.rmmagazine.com/2017/09/01/four-key-cyberrisk-management-questions-for-directors-
and-officers/ accessed on 15 November 2017. 
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of business nor a mere supplement to a firm’s overall compliance programme. 
Instead, it is an integral component of strategy, culture, and business operations. The 
board should ensure that the company has comprehensive cyber liability insurance 
coverage. 72  
4.7.7 Failure to discharge the duty to manage cyber risks: 
Where directors fall short of the expected standard of due care and fail to adequately 
address cyber risks facing their companies they may be subject to litigation, 
regulatory and shareholder criticism and exposure should a successful cyber-attack 
or breach occur.73 
In the UK in 2015, shareholders of Home Depot, sued 12 company directors 
and officers in a derivative action lawsuit, for breaching their fiduciary duties of 
loyalty, good faith, and due care by knowingly and consciously disregarding their 
duties and failing to ensure that Home Depot took reasonable measures to protect its 
customers’ personal and financial information. Should this action succeed Home 
Depot will need to change its governance structure, reorganise risk management 
entities, and pay the shareholders’ attorneys more than $1 million, among other 
costly and time-consuming charges.74 
72 Ibid. 
73‘Cyber Risks: Board responsibilities’ Vorys 2014, available at, https://www.vorys.com/publications-
1316.html accessed on 15 November 2017. 
74 Sarkar op cit (n71).  
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Types of cyber liability exposure 
As established in the section on ‘counting the cost of cybercrime’ and as advised by 
the Insurance Information Institute75, businesses may in the event of cyber-attack, be 
exposed to the following costs against them and their directors:  
1. Liability: Business may be liable for costs incurred by customers and other
third parties as a result of a cyber-attack or another IT-related incident.
2. System and/or Data recovery: Repairing or replacing computer systems or
lost data can result in significant costs. In addition, companies may not be
able to remain operational while their systems are inaccessible, resulting in
further revenue loss.
3. Breach notification expenses—In certain jurisdictions, if a business stores
customer data, it is required to notify customers if a data breach has occurred
or merely just suspected. This can be costly, especially if there are many
customers.
4. Regulatory fines and Penalties: Several sector regulations require businesses
and organisations to protect consumer data. If a data breach results from a
business’s failure to meet compliance requirements, the business may incur
substantial fines.
5. Class action lawsuits: Large-scale data breaches have led to class action
lawsuits filed on behalf of customers whose data and privacy were
compromised.
6. Shareholder liability: for failing to prevent the data breach or properly
disclosing the cyber risks.
7. Reimbursement and/or reissuance: to customers for fraudulent transactions
8. Businesses may also need to financially recover from reputational harm to
their brand, theft of trade secrets, cyber extortion and network or business
interruption depending on the form of cybercrime they suffered, its impact
and the extent thereof.
75 ‘Cyber liability risks’ 2017 Insurance information Institute, available at, 
https://www.iii.org/article/cyber-liability-risks accessed on 15 November 2017. 
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4.7.8 Cyber liability insurance 
Cyber insurance taken out by business should at the least cover the business 
in terms of the cyber liabilities the business may be exposed to, as discussed above. 
The market for cyber insurance policies is still in its infancy and policies have not 
yet been standardised, care should be taken to find someone with experience, such as 
an insurance agent or attorney who can assist with the negotiation and review of the 
cyber insurance policies being considered.76  
Types of cyber insurance policies: 
There are in general, two types of cyber insurance policies that corporations 
may take out to cover themselves against liabilities that may come about due to 
realised cyber risks. A typical third party cyber insurance policy covers privacy 
liability, network security liability and intellectual property and media breaches. 
Insured losses covered by privacy liability include legal liability, vicarious liability, 
and crisis control. Network security liability coverage insures against costs from 
reinstatement and costs from legal proceedings, and intellectual property and media 
breaches cover insures against legal liability losses.77 
A typical first party cyber insurance policy, on the other hand, will offer an 
organisation crisis management cover, business interruption data asset protection 
cover and cyber extortion cover. Costs to reinstate reputation, for notification of 
stakeholders and continuous monitoring, are covered by the crisis management 
cover. Business interruption data asset protection cover insures losses from costs for 
reinstatements, loss of profit, data replacement costs, and costs from reinstatement or 
replacement of intellectual property. Cyber extortion insures losses arising from 
extortion payments and costs related to avoid extortion. 78   
4.7.9 Cyber Risk Insurance – South Africa 
76 Vorys op cit (n73).  
77 Biener op cit (n12) 7. 
78 Ibid. 
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The management of cyber risks at board level is a critical component of the 
board’s responsibilities and has become an integral part of enterprise risk 
management. Directors fiduciary duty of care cannot ignore cyber risks and must 
oversee the enforcement of appropriate and adequate controls to address and mitigate 
the potentially devastating impact of cybercrimes. 
An increasing number of businesses in South Africa are taking out specialised 
cybercrime insurance cover. As cyber insurance is still in its infancy in South Africa 
insurers are encountering problems at risk assessment stage with predicting 
probability of a cybercrime occurring and determining its business impact and 
quantifying the financial impact of a cyber-attack as they can result in a myriad of 
negative business consequences. The insurance industry is still to develop standard 
methodologies and financial models to determine the appropriate price to adequately 
cover cybercrime risks. The lack of historical data is also problematic to insurance 
firms when deciding the rate at which to underwrite the risks. The lack of standard 
legal definitions of cyber liability across the world also impacts on the insurance of 
cyber risks. The geographic limitation of domestic laws creates difficulties when 
determining which country’s laws are applicable when a cross-border cyber-attack 
occurs.79 
79 B O’Connor & V Moodley op cit (n4). 
5. Challenges
Cybercrime is transnational, borderless in nature and does not require knowledge of 
or proximity to the target. It poses a unique set of challenges, namely: logistics, 
combating anonymity, accessing electronic information and transnational 
enforcement. Due to these challenges, existing criminal laws regulating cyberspace 
tend to result in few successful prosecutions.1. 
Cybercrimes are constantly evolving and taking on newer forms. This calls 
for a nimble and responsive approach to tackling this pandemic. The current laws 
used to prosecute cybercrimes have not kept up with these evolutions. They lack 
definitional clarity hence many of the cybercrimes are in fact not offences according 
to local statues and are prosecuted using laws of other countries or traditional 
criminal laws where possible. This lack of definition clarity also hampers the 
provision of cyber insurance as there is still no agreed on definition of ‘cyber 
liability’.  There are also some areas of our current cyber laws that fall short and 
should be reviewed: 
 Criminalising crimes that relate to intangible data;
 Review of current procedural laws to support and facilitate intensive
cybercrime investigations;
 There is no obligation on internet service providers to report cybercrimes.2
Our current cybersecurity laws spread across multiple ministries and lead to clashes 
in mandate in investigating or prosecuting cyber incidents3. As cybercrimes tend to 
be cross-border in nature, the absence of ratified conventions that extend jurisdiction, 
1 Cassim op cit (n7) 39. 
2 ‘Cybercrime in South Africa: What’s the Plan?’ Hooybeg Attorneys 2016, available at 
https://hooyberglaw.wordpress.com/2016/02/29/cybercrime-in-south-africa-whats-the-plan/ accessed 
on 06 December 2017. 
3 ‘Discussion of the cybercrime and cybersecurity’ Department of Justice, 2016, available at
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/CyberCrimesDiscussionDocument2017.pdf, accessed on 01 
August 2017.   
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makes it difficult to effectively deal with these forms of cybercrimes accordingly. 
Geographical limits thus restrict South Africa’s country’s cyber laws.  
The domestic police force operates with limited resources and lacks specialist 
skills to take on the complex‚ multijurisdictional investigations.4 relating to 
cybercrimes. Despite the National Director of Public Prosecutions reporting 289 
prosecuted cases related to cybercrime in 2017, and a remarkable 97% conviction 
rate5, very few of the cases test the ECT Act to develop much required precedent.6 In 
comparisons with 4779 convictions for sexual offences, this figure confirms that not 
enough cases of cybercrime are being reported and prosecuted annually. Of the 
three7 unreported cybercrime related cases cited in the annual report, it is only the 
case of State v Mduduzi Mkhize where the ECT Act was used to secure a conviction.  
Harmonisation of cybercrime laws across ministries domestically and 
internationally with other sovereign states remains a challenge. It is made more 
complex when seeking to address matters such as substantive and procedural law, 
mutual assistance, and extradition. Noting that each country will come to the 
harmonisation table with its own perspective, influenced by its legal tradition(s) as 
well as cultural and historical factors. The object of harmonisation is to ‘harmonise’ 
and not to produce ‘identical’ copies. What is required is complementarity enabling 
enforcement mechanisms to work effectively while respecting national and regional 
differences.8  
South Africa has signed but not yet ratified the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime. As a founding member of the association of five the major emerging 
national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), there 
4 Ibid. 
5 National Prosecution Authority ‘Annual Report National Director of Public Prosecutions 2016/17’ 
available at https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/annual-reports/NDPP-Annual%20Report-2016-
17.pdf, accessed on 13 February 2018
6 K O’Riley ‘South African law coming to grips with cybercrime’ 2013 De Rebus
7 State v Mduduzi Mkhize; State v N Idediora and another; State v Matatu and 4 others
8 Clough op cit (n77).
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seems to be a problem with ratifying a convention from the COE as BRICS members 
much prefer to ratify a ‘more universal international instrument’9. Member states of 
BRICS consider the United Nations (UN) as the agency that has a central role in 
developing universally accepted norms of responsible state behaviour in the use of 
ICTs to ensure a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative, stable, orderly, accessible, and 
equitable ICT environment. BRICS members are mostly concerned about the 
upholding of state sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and 
sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms which they feel would be 
compromised by ratifying the COE convention on cybercrime.10 
6. Conclusion, Recommendations, and future Research Areas
6.1 Conclusion 
Even though the term ‘cybercrime’ has been around in legal system and parlance for 
some time now, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that it is still misused, 
misunderstood, and ambiguously applied. This lack of understanding does not stop at 
the colloquial level but has crossed over into industrial, academic, and statutory 
nomenclature. The menace has instead intensified and taken on juggernaut-like 
proportions, getting stronger as it spreads and morphs into different attack vectors, 
making it harder to stop, comprehend and prosecute.  
The battle against cybercrime cannot be won without first understanding the 
phenomenon. To arrive at this understanding multiple courses will need to be 
chartered. First a common understanding of all cybercrime and related terminology 
will need to be developed. Once the lexicon is in place, drafting of the necessary 
artefacts for the harmonisation of ICT strategy, policy and regulatory frameworks 
can be undertaken in earnest. With the cybercrimes, penalties and prosecutorial 
procedures codified, grand scale education, training and awareness of all 
stakeholders can begin in earnest. Cybercrimes are multi-jurisdictional in nature and 
9 LexInformatica – 2013 Cyberlaw Conference, A Nel ‘Advancement of cyberlaw and information 
ethics in Africa and globally’ available at http://www.justice.gov.za/cfw/confw.htm accessed on 22 
December 2017.  
10 DIRCO ‘Xiamen Declaration’ 2017 BRICS available at http://bit.ly/2CWOiSs accessed on 22 
December 2017.  
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thus also call for a cross-sector, intra-ministerial, public-private and multinational 
partnering and working together. 
6.2 Recommendations 
6.2.1 Technical: Broadband and Infrastructure 
The path to economic emancipation, employment opportunities and overall 
sustainable positive GDP growth in the digital era begins with access to reliable, 
secure and affordable broadband internet access. For the South African Government 
to realise its own broadband targets and gain improved infrastructure cybersecurity 
recommended: 
a) Access to the internet must be deemed a human right by the RSA
government by ratifying the UN Human Rights Council non-binding
resolution on ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights
on the Internet’1;
b) Honour NDP commitment on implementing broadband by delivering on
targets of the National Broadband Policy (SA Connect), SIP 15, MTSF
(2014 – 2019) and the National e-Strategy.
c) The establishment of sectoral computer emergency response teams
(CERT) starting with the development of a financial sector CERT as with
the government of INDIA2. This Fin-CERT should work with the
financial sector regulators, Central Bank, and national CSIRT to
strengthen cyber security in critical national infrastructures and facilitate
the development and implementation of internationally recognised
cybersecurity standards, frameworks, and tools.
d) Establishment of or sectoral information sharing and analysis centres
(ISACs)3 for collecting, analysing and sharing of cyber threat intelligence
1 ‘32nd session of the Human Rights Council’ 8th July 2016 United Nations Human rights council 
available at 
at,http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/Pages/32RegularSession.asp
x accessed on 30 November 2017. 
2 India Ministry of Finance op cit (n6). 
3 ISAC Available at http://bit.ly/2AJZQD6 accessed on 28 December 2017. 
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and provision of tools to mitigate risks and improve resilience. The 
USA’s FS-ISAC and SABRIC are great models that the rest of South 
Africa’s critical infrastructure sectors can reference.  
6.2.2 Cooperation: Agreements, Treaties and Conventions 
As cybercrime is in its nature a global issue, it calls for coordinated ministerial, 
sectorial, and national approaches. South Africa’s current jurisdictional challenges 
that limit and hamper cybercriminal investigations can be remedied by concluding 
international cooperation, mutual assistance, and enforcement agreements in tandem 
with harmonising of cybercrime legislation, standards, and procedures. 
South Africa has the option to ratify the COE’s Convention on Cybercrime, failing 
which the following is recommended to improve cooperation and establishment of 
mutual assistance: 
a) National: Ensure coordination of the various laws dealing with cyber
security that have overlapping mandates and responsibilities between
different government ministries;
b) Continental Convention: Ratify and implement the African Union
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection adopted in
2014 and harmonize domestic IT laws and frameworks accordingly;
c) Economic Region: Implement the BRICS Roadmap of Practical
Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICTs and the BRICS
Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Ensuring Security in the
use of ICTs as per the Xiamen Declaration4;
d) International: Affiliate to the UN’s 2011 UNODC led Global Programme
on Cybercrime5 mandated to assist member States with cyber-related
crimes through capacity building and technical assistance;
4 DIRCO op cit (n10).  
5 ‘UNODC Global Programme on Cybercrime’ available at http://bit.ly/2AN6DvP accessed on 04 
January 2018. 
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e) International: Implement the ITU Global Cybercrime Agenda framework
for international cooperation aimed at enhancing confidence and security
in the information society6.
f) International: Endorse the proposed 2015 UN International Code of
Conduct for Information Security7 drafted to strengthen international
cooperation and formulate relevant international norms;
g) Mutual legal assistance treaties and inter-agency8 agreements may also be
concluded, in the absence of conventions and treaties that establish
international corporation. The following conventions of the AU9 and
EU10 may both be referenced.
6.2.3 ICT Legislative Framework 
The legal framework regulating cyber security in South Africa is a hybrid of 
legislation and the common law. There is a need to review the local statutes and 
harmonise them with their regional and international legal standards.  
The most impactful starting point for the RSA government, would be to, once 
all due processes have been completed, enact, and promulgate the CAC Bill, 2017. 
Apart from defining ‘cybercrime’ and related terms, this bill will assist the 
understanding and combating of cybercrime in numerous ways including the 
regulating the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements, founding jurisdiction and 
international cooperation in respect of cross-border investigation of cybercrime, 
providing for the creation of various structures to deal with cyber security including 
establishment of an all-hours national cybercrime centre, the declaration, regulating 
the identification and protection of national critical information infrastructure and 
repeal or amend certain applicable laws currently in effect. 11 
6 GCA available at http://bit.ly/2CZZPRT accessed on 04 January 2018. 
7 UN International Code of Conduct for Information Security Available at http://bit.ly/1hFMUph 
accessed on 04 January 2018. 
8 Council of Europe Inter-Agency and International Cooperation for Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of Online Crime Proceeds available at http://bit.ly/2EtO7uJ accessed on 05 January 2017. 
9 African Union Convention on cybersecurity and personal data collection, Article 28(2). 
10 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual assistance in criminal matters.  
11 ‘Discussion of the cybercrime and cybersecurity’ Department of Justice, 2016, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/CyberCrimesDiscussionDocument2017.pdf, accessed on 01 
August 2017. 
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The protection of the nation critical information, sensitive and mission 
critical company data and personal information can be improved by putting into 
effect the entire Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 and not just some 
parts of it12 (like the UK’s 1998 Data Protection Act and the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation). Once the entire Act is fully in effect then it is recommended 
that sector authorities issue cybersecurity standards and guidelines for cybersecurity 
and cyber-risk management.  
It is recommended that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing 
requirements13 and the relevant instruments of the Financial Service Board14 be 
amended to give effect to s22: “Notifications of security compromises”, of the POPI 
Act. This recommendation is made to strengthen the (minority) shareholder’s when 
holding to account, directors who default on their duty of care to manage company 
cyber risks.  This recommendation is in line with the technology and information 
disclosure requirements of principle 12 of the King IV Code and s165(2) of the 
Companies Act, where company information is essential to bring a suitable demand 
before the court. Furthermore, this recommendation has the potential to benefit the 
derivative litigants in a manner similar to public enforcement. Section 17 of the USA 
Securities Exchange Act15 and the New York State Department of Financial 
Services16 have all effected changes similar to those recommended,  
6.2.4 Dedicated Arrangements to Manage Cybercrime 
Once the ICT legislative framework has been strengthened to outlaw and prosecute 
cybercrimes, the need for mechanisms, actors, supporting structures and 
arrangements is then created. These agencies and arrangements are recommended as 
12 ‘Commencement of sections of the Protection of Personal Information Act’ Government Gazette 
37544 SAICA available at http://bit.ly/2mehwS9 accessed on 8 January 2018. 
13 JSE Limited Listing Requirements (2017) Available at, 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20Listings%20Requirement
s.pdf accessed on 13 February 2017.
14 Financial Services Board Available at,
https://www.fsb.co.za/Departments/insurance/Pages/legislation.aspx, accessed on 13 February 2017.
15 US Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
16 New York Department of Financial Services ‘Cybersecurity Regulations’ (2017) Available
at,http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf accessed on 16 November 2017.
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they are essential for the preventative, corrective and restorative aspects dealing with 
cybercrime in South Africa.   
It is recommended that the National Cybersecurity Policy framework for South 
Africa be fully implemented as it will assist in combating cybercrime by, inter alia 
providing additional definitions for cyber terminology, securing government 
commitment, establishing dedicated bodies for national cybersecurity decision 
making, coordination for all role players involved, and capacity development for 
cyber-criminal threat intelligence, investigations, and prosecution.17 
It is further recommended that the following, as promised in the National Cyber 
Security Framework, be implemented: 
i. Draft Cyber Security Policy, which seeks to propose a cyber security
policy approach for SA;
ii. Draft National Critical Information Infrastructure Policy, which
outlines an approach to the identification, protection and security of
national information infrastructure that is categorised as critical for
the provisioning of essential services to South Africans;
iii. Draft Cyber Crime Policy and Strategy, which seeks to develop a
national policy and strategy approach to combating cybercrime;
iv. A Draft Cyber Defence Strategy;
v. Cyber defence for South Africa and is led by the Department of
Defence;
vi. Draft Cyber Security Awareness Strategy, which proposes measures
to deal with relevant aspects of cyber security awareness within SA.
It is recommended that a Cyber Appellate Tribunal fashioned around the one 
in India18 be considered. A new dispensation of virtual and electronic trials can then 
be ushered in and provide a platform for specialist cybercrime legal practitioners to 
develop much needed precedents for the courts.  
17 National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa (2015) 7. 
18 India Cyber Appellate Division available at http://cyatindia.gov.in/Constitution.aspx accessed on 
09 January 2017. 
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Investigation and prosecuting of cybercrimes requires specialised techniques 
and procedures that are not readily available in the domestic law enforcement 
agencies and the criminal justice system. It is thus recommended that the law 
enforcement officials, legal practitioners19 , and presiding officers be regularly 
provided with training on effectively investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes.  
6.2.5 On-going Cybercrime awareness 
Governments are tasked with raising cyber security awareness within their countries. 
Combating cybercrime does not only require technical and regulatory intervention, it 
also relies on people. Public awareness tools may be used to stimulate, motivate, and 
remind the audience what is expected of them. This is an important aspect of cyber 
security because it enhances the security knowledge of users, changes attitude 
towards cyber security, and changes behaviour patterns. These factors improve the 
resilience of users against cyber-attacks.20 
a) South Africa should increase its cyber security awareness programmes by
collaborating on cyber security awareness at government, business, and
societal levels, as guided by an African Cyber Security Awareness
Framework.21
b) It is recommended that the South African government partner with
universities22 and institutions of higher learning to develop national education
programmes and academic curricula that will be for cybersecurity research,
and the development of standards and certifications. Professional cyber
security training courses can then be offered by these universities. In so doing
19 M Mamabolo ‘Ghana to train ECOWAS neighbours in cybercrime and e-evidence’ (2017) ITWEB 
available at http://bit.ly/2CXWgLR accessed on 23 December 2017. 
20Proceedings of Southern African Cyber Security Awareness Workshop (SACSAW), 2011 IZ 
Dlamini et al, ‘Framework for an African Policy towards creating cyber security awareness’, para 4. 
21 Ibid.  
22 UK National Cyber Security Centre, Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security research 
available at http://bit.ly/2D1QAk0 accessed on 09 January 2018. 
99 
the cyber workforce can be sustainably increased, home-grown, and 
periodically assessed23 post qualification within their workplaces. 
c) Regular and effective National Cybersecurity Awareness24 programmes and
initiatives are recommended.
d) Regular and effective national and sector simulated cyber-attack exercises/
war games25 are recommended.
e) It is recommended that national cyber security assessments be performed
annually and the ITU’s global cybersecurity index be completed regularly to
holistically assess the country’s cybersecurity posture and the commitment of
member states towards cybersecurity.
23 US Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act 2016 available at http://bit.ly/2D1gvHy., 
accessed on 10 February 2015. 
24 National Cybersecurity Awareness Month, Prof. Hlengiwe Mkhize 2016 Available at, 
https://www.dtps.gov.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=682:national-
cybersecurity-awareness-month&catid=10&Itemid=137 accessed on 06 December 2017. 
25 An Introduction to Cyber War Games, Deloitte, 2014, Available at, 






Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Statutes 
India 
Information Technology Act of 2000 
Information Technology Amendment Act of 2008 
Kenya 
Computer and Cybercrimes Bill 2016. 
Information Communication and Technology Amendment Act of 2013. 
Information and Communications Act 2013. 
South Africa 
ECT Act 
ECTA, Amendment Bill,2012 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Critical Infrastructure Bill 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill of 2017 
The Banks Act 4 of 1990.  
The Banks Regulations (published in Government Gazette no. 21726 of 8 November 
2000. 
The United Kingdom  
Computer Misuse Act 1990 
The United States of America 
The Uniting, and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001. 
Cyber Act of War Bill of 2016. 
US Penal Code  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
Racketeering  
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
Cases 
Cape Empowerment Trust Limited v Druker and others [2016] JOL 36987 (WCC). 
Kukama v Lobelo and Others (38587/2011) [2012] ZAGPJHC 60. 
101 
Loureiro v iMvula Quality Protection (PTY) Ltd 2014 3 SA 394 (CC). 
Msimang NO and another v Katuliiba and others [2013] JOL 30522 (GSJ). 
Mouritzen v Greystone Enterprises (Pty) Ltd & Another (10442/2011) [2012] 
ZAKZDHC. 
Applicable Unreported cases (2017): State v Mduduzi Mkhize; State v N Idediora 
and another; State v Matatu and 4 others 
Secondary Sources 
Books 
Kshetri N Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South (Palgrave Macmillan, 
London, 2013) 
Kramer F et al ‘Cyberpower and National Security’ 6ed (Washington, D.C: Center 
for Technology and National Security Policy2009 439, 2009) 
Ohlin JD et al ‘Cyberwar. Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts’ (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2015) 
Papadopoulous, S & Snail, S ‘Cyber@lawSA’ 3ed (Van Schaik, Pretoria, 2012) 
Ryle G ‘The Concept of the Mind’ 6ed (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002) 
Siebel, T & House, P ‘Cyber Rules: Strategies for excelling at e-business’ (Currency 
DoubleDay, United States of America, 1999)  
Journals 
Bouwman N ‘An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and 
Skill’ 4 SA Mercantile Law Journal 21 (2009) 510-511. 
Cassim, F ‘Formulating specialised legislation to address the growing spectre of 
cybercrimes: A Comparative Study’ (2009) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
Volume 12 
Cassim, F ‘Addressing the spectre of cyber terrorism: A comparative perspective’ 
(2012) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal Volume 15 
Clough JA world of difference: The Budapest convention on cybercrime and the 
challenges of harmonisation’ (2014) 40 Monash University Law Review Volume 3. 
102 
Gordon S& Ford R ‘On the definition and classification of cybercrime’ (2006) 
Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques Volume 2. 
Healey J and Wilson A.J. ‘Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution’ 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 2012.  
Hughes D & Colarik A ‘The Hierarchy of Cyber War Definitions’ Massey 
University, 2017    
Madarie R ‘Hackers’ Motivations: Testing Schwartz’s Theory of Motivational Types 
of Values in a Sample of Hackers’  (2017) International Journal of Cyber 
Criminology, Vol 11   
Mangena D ‘Will legislation protect your virtual space? Discussing the draft 
Cybercrime and Cyber Security Bill’ (2016) De Rebus. 
Nattrass N ‘The new growth path: Game changing vision or cop-out?’107 South 
African Journal of Science (2011) . 
Ncube, Caroline B ‘You’re fired! The removal of directors under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008’ 2011 SALJ Volume 1. 
Njontini MN ‘Protecting Critical Databases – Towards a risk based assessment of 
critical information infrastructures in South Africa’ 2013 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal Volume 16. 
O’Riley K ‘South African law coming to grips with cybercrime’ 2013 De Rebus 
Price A ‘The contract/delict interface in the Constitutional Court’ 2014 Stellenbosch 
Law Review Volume 25. 
Sabillon R et al ‘Cybercriminals, cyberattacks and cybercrime. Privacy, security and 
control’ (2016) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
Shackelford SJ ‘Towards Cyber-peace: Managing Cyberattacks through Polycentric 
Governance’ (2013) American University Law Review Volume 62  
Stevens R ‘The legal nature of the duty of care and skill’ : Contract or Delict’, 2016, 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal Volume 19. 
Stoop H ‘The business judgment rule: how the Companies Act of 2008 is impacting 
on directors’ duties’2012 SALJ Volume 129. 
103 
Theses 
B Mupangavanhu 2016 ‘Directors’ Standards of Care, Skill, Diligence, And The 
Business Judgment Rule In View of South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008: 
Future Implications For Corporate Governance’ 192  
MF Cassim ‘The statutory derivative action under the Companies Act of 2008: 
Guidelines for the exercise of the judicial discretion’ (2014) available at 
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/13147/thesis_hum_2014_cassim_mf.pdf?seque
nce=1 , accessed on 12 February 2018. 
Internet References  
‘32nd session of the Human Rights Council’ 8th July 2016 United Nations Human 
rights council available at 
at,http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session32/Pages/32Re
gularSession.aspx accessed on 30 November 2017. 
An Introduction to Cyber War Games, Deloitte,  2014, Available at, 
http://deloitte.wsj.com/cio/2014/09/22/an-introduction-to-cyber-war-games/ 
accessed on 06 December 2017. 
Atkinson S ‘Psychology and the hacker – Psychological Incident Handling’, 2015 
available at  https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/psychology-
hacker-psychological-incident-handling-36077 para 2 accessed on 10 November 
2017. 
Arora R ‘Introduction to Cyber-crimes, cyber security, and legal aspects’, available 
at, http://bit.ly/2FZPB0S, 2013, accessed on 07 April 2017.  
Anderson R et al ‘Measuring the cost of cybercrime’ 2012, available at, 
http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2012/presentation/Moore_presentation_WE
IS2012.pdf,  accessed on 04 December 2017. 
Accenture ‘Cost of Cyber Crime Framework’,2017 available at 
https://www.accenture.com/t20170926T072837Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-
61/Accenture-2017-CostCyberCrimeStudy.pdf accessed on 12 December 2017 p24 
Bergin T ‘Costs of bank cyber thefts hit SWIFT profit last year’ 2017, available 
at,https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-banks-swift-cybercrime/costs-of-bank-cyber-
thefts-hit-swift-profit-last-year-idUKKBN1910FX accessed on 04 December 2017. 
104 
Biener C et al ‘Insurability of Cyber Risks: An empirical analysis’ (2015) Institute of 
Insurance Economics available at http://bit.ly/2FeD6if accessed on 28 December 
2017  4. 
Burns E ‘Periodic table of cybercrime attacks: curing cybersecurity’s tunnel 
vision’2017, available at, 
https://www.cbronline.com/cybersecurity/business/periodic-table-cybercrime-
attacks-curing-cybersecuritys-tunnel-vision/ ,accessed on 03 December 2017. 
‘CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2’, U.S. Security and Exchange Commission 
2011,available at, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-
topic2.htm accessed on 16 November 2017. 
‘Cybersecurity, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’2015, available at, 
http://www.finra.org/industry/cybersecurity , accessed on 20 November 2017. 
‘Commencement of sections of the Protection of Personal Information Act’ 
Government Gazette 37544 SAICA available at http://bit.ly/2mehwS9 accessed on 8 
January 2018. 
Council of Europe Inter-Agency and International Cooperation for Search, Seizure 
and Confiscation of Online Crime Proceeds available at http://bit.ly/2EtO7uJ 
accessed on 05 January 2017. 
‘Cyber Risks: Board responsibilities’ Vorys 2014, available at, 
https://www.vorys.com/publications-1316.html accessed on 15 November 2017. 
‘Cyber liability risks’ 2017 Insurance information Institute, available at, 
https://www.iii.org/article/cyber-liability-risks accessed on 15 November 2017. 
‘Cybercrime in South Africa: What’s the Plan?’ Hooybeg Attorneys 2016, available 
at https://hooyberglaw.wordpress.com/2016/02/29/cybercrime-in-south-africa-
whats-the-plan/ accessed on 06 December 2017. 
‘Cyber Crime – Legal Guidance’ The Crown Prosecutors 2017, available at 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/cybercrime-legal-guidance, accessed on 17 
December 2017. 
‘Cybercrime’ European Commission, 2017, available at, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/cybercrime_en, 
accessed on 19 April 2017. 
Davids N ‘SA is the leading target in Africa for cyber crime, warns legal firm’ 2017, 
available at,https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-02-13-sa-is-the-
leading-target-in-africa-for-cyber-crime-warns-legal-firm/ accessed on 01 August 
2017.  
Developing case involving mobile money platform and all banks in India, October 
2017 , available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-
105 
biz/startups/mobikwik-glitch-cops-track-those-who-transferred-
funds/articleshow/60898149.cms accessed on 5 December 2017. 
‘Discussion of the cybercrime and cybersecurity’  Department of Justice, 2016, 
available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/bills/CyberCrimesDiscussionDocument2017.pd
f  accessed on 01 August 2017.   
DIRCO ‘Xiamen Declaration’ 2017 BRICS available at http://bit.ly/2CWOiSs 
accessed on 22 December 2017. 
‘Directors liability Booklet’ Werksmans Attorneys 2013, available at, 
https://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Werksmans-Directors-
Liability-Booklet.pdf , accessed on 12 February 2018. 
‘Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards’ Financial services Sector 
Coordinating Council 2017 Available at, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2017/February/20170221/R-1550/R-
1550_021717_131709_429070260162_1.pdf accessed on  13 December 2017. 
Ellipsis ‘Policy direction on effective competition in broadband markets’, 2016 
available at http://bit.ly/2BiUouT, accessed on 21 August 2017. 
Frierson R, ‘Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security’ 2017, available at, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2017/May/20170518/R-1550/R-
1550_021717_131709_429070260162_1.pdf accessed on 16 November 2017. 
‘Financial Institutions Examination Council’ 2017, Available at, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/ accessed on 16 November 2017. 
Flockhart R ‘Cyber risk and directors' liabilities: an international perspective’ 2016, 
Norton Rose Fulbright available at, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/145122/cyber-risk-and-
directors-liabilities-an-international-perspective accessed on 16 November 2017. 
Financial Services Board Available at , 
https://www.fsb.co.za/Departments/insurance/Pages/legislation.aspx , accessed on 
13 February 2017. 
Farisani DM ‘Corporate Criminal Liability for Deaths, Injuries and Illnesses: Is 
South Africa’s Mining Sector Ready for Change?’ 2015 available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Corporate-Criminal- 
GCA available at http://bit.ly/2CZZPRT accessed on 04 January 2018. 
Gercke M ‘Understanding Cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges, and legal 
responses.’ 2012, available at, http://www.itu.int/ITU-
106 
D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime%20legislation%20EV6.pdf, accessed on 5 
April 2017. 
Geach W ‘Statutory, Common Law And Other Duties Of Directors’ Available at  
https://www.chartsec.co.za/documents/speakerPres/WalterGeach/GeachStatutoryCo
mmonLawAndOtherDutiesOfDirectors.pdf, 2009, accessed on 11 February 2018. 
Gemalto ‘2017 First Half Breach Level Index’2017, available at 
http://breachlevelindex.com/assets/Breach-Level-Index-Report-H1-2017-
Gemalto.pdf accessed on 13 November 2017. 
Gervais B ‘Cyber Risk Management Guidance for Corporate Directors’, 2017 
available at, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=800d6480-500a-424d-
839f-68879eb98637 accessed on 16 November 2017. 
Gordon B ‘Internet Criminal Law’ Available at, 
http://www.legalnet.co.za/cyberlaw/cybertext/chapter15.htm, accessed on 08 
November 2017 para 426. 
Glance D ‘What is the Dark Web?’ 2017, available at  
http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-dark-web-46070> accessed on 12 
December 2017. 
Hummel R ‘Securing against the most common vectors of cyber attacks ’2017 SANS 
Institute available at, https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/riskmanagement/securing-common-vectors-cyber-attacks-37995 
,accessed on 04 December 2017. 
Hunt T ‘Questions about the Massive South African "Master Deeds" Data Breach 
Answered’2017, available at https://www.troyhunt.com/questions-about-the-
massive-south-african-master-deeds-data-breach-answered/ accessed on 13 
November 2017. 
Hutchinson W ‘Survival in the e-conomy: 2nd Australian information warfare & 
security conference 2001’ 2001, available at 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7758&context=ecuworks#page=38 
accessed on 8 November 2017 
Information Security Forum ‘Protecting the Crown Jewels’2016, available at  
https://www.securityforum.org/uploads/2016/09/ISF_Protecting-the-Crown-Jewels-
Executive-Summary-final.pdf accessed on 13 November 2017. 
Institute of Risk Management ‘Cyber risk and risk management’ 2018, available at, 
https://www.theirm.org/knowledge-and-resources/thought-leadership/cyber-risk/ 
accessed 13 November 2017. 
107 
‘Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Executive Order 13636’ 2013, 
available at, http://www.cyberriskinsuranceforum.com/sites/default/files/preliminary-
cybersecurity-framework.pdf accessed on 14 November 2017. 
Irwin L ‘More data was lost or stolen in the first half of 2017 than all of 2016’ IT 
Governance Institute 2017, available at http://bit.ly/2EPoU1L , accessed on 13 
November 2017. 
International Telecommunication Union (2017) ‘Global Cybersecurity Index 2017 
Africa Report’ 27, available at http://bit.ly/2C3zrRn, accessed on 29 December 2017. 
ISAC Available at http://bit.ly/2AJZQD6 accessed on 28 December 2017. 
India Cyber Appellate Division available at http://cyatindia.gov.in/Constitution.aspx 
accessed on 09 January 2017. 
India Ministry of Finance ‘Report of The Working Group For Setting Up of 
Computer Emergency Response Team In The Financial Sector (Cert-Fin)’ 2017, 
available at,http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Press-CERT-Fin%20Report.pdf 
accessed on 18 November 2017. 
Internet Safety Campaign Africa ‘Cybercrime Definition’ available at 
http://cybercrime.org.za/definition accessed on 29 March 2017. 
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa ‘King IV Report on Corporate Governance 
for South Africa’ (2016) 21. 
ICO fines Sony £250,000 for failure to prevent hacking on Sony PlayStation 
Network Platform, by PLC IPIT & Communications’,  2013 available at, 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-523-
7306?originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData
=(sc.Default)&comp=pluk accessed on 16 November 2017. 
JSE Limited Listing Requirements (2017) Available at, 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20Listings
%20Requirements.pdf accessed on 13 February 2017. 
Juma V ‘CBK tells banks to boost cyber crime protection’ 2017, available at, 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/New-cyber-crime-rule-for-commercial-
banks/539546-3981762-12c4in7/index.html , accessed on 21 November 2017. 
Kanza E ‘How universal internet access could reboot South Africa’ (16/062017) 
World Economic Forum, available at http://bit.ly/2z9sgcx, accessed on 15 November 
2017. 
Kerala High Court, C.M Philip vs The Registrar of Co-Operative, 2013, available at, 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16257664/ accessed on 5 December 2017. 
108 
Kisicek G & Zagar IZ ‘What do we know about the world? Rhetorical and 
argumentative perspectives’,2013, available at http://bit.ly/2C6f2LD, accessed on 20 
April 2017. 
Liability-for-Deaths-Injuries-and-IllnessArticleby-DM-Farisani.pdf, accessed on 12 
February 2018. 
LexInformatica – 2013 Cyberlaw Conference, A Nel ‘Advancement of cyberlaw and 
information ethics in Africa and globally’ available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/cfw/confw.htm accessed on 22 December 2017.  
Lipton M, ‘Risk Management and the Board of Directors’, Harvard Law School , 
2017 available at , https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/15/risk-management-
and-the-board-of-directors-4/ accessed on 02 November 2017.  
Mamabolo M ‘Ghana to train ECOWAS neighbours in cybercrime and e-evidence’ 
(2017) ITWEB available at http://bit.ly/2CXWgLR accessed on 23 December 2017. 
McAfee ‘McAfee and CSIS: Stopping Cybercrime Can Positively Impact World 
Economies’ 2014 available at, 
https://www.mcafee.com/us/about/news/2014/q2/20140609-01.aspx accessed 20 
November 2017. 
Minges M ‘Exploring the Relationship Between Broadband and Economic Growth’ 
World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends, 2016, available at 
http://bit.ly/2lZTn4p, accessed on 7 December 2017. 
Morgus R et al ‘National CSIRTs and Their Role in Computer Security Incident 
Response’ 2015, available at http://bit.ly/2BDskCP accessed on 05 December 2017 
5.  
National Prosecution Authority ‘Annual Report National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2016/17’ available at https://www.npa.gov.za/sites/default/files/annual-
reports/NDPP-Annual%20Report-2016-17.pdf, accessed on 13 February 2018 
National Cybersecurity Awareness Month, Prof. Hlengiwe Mkhize 2016 Available 
at, 
https://www.dtps.gov.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=682:nati
onal-cybersecurity-awareness-month&catid=10&Itemid=137 accessed on 06 
December 2017. 
New York Department of Financial Services ‘Cybersecurity Regulations’ (2017) 
Available at,http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf 
accessed on 16 November 2017. 
Ngafeeson M ‘Cybercrime Classification: A Motivational Model’, 2009, available at 
http://www.swdsi.org/swdsi2010/SW2010_Preceedings/papers/PA168.pdf accessed 
on 10 November 2017. 
109 
Nyamanga M ‘A Layered Framework Approach to Mitigate Crimeware’ (2010) 
Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. Available at 
http://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2010/thursday/7 accessed on 30 January 2018 
‘National Infrastructure Protection Plan’ Department of Homeland Security 2017, 
available at, https://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan accessed 
on 14 November 2017. 
O’Connor B & Moodley V ‘The Growing Need For Cybercrime Insurance In South 
Africa’ 2016, available 
at,https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/export/sites/cdh/en/news/publications/2016/
dispute/downloads/Dispute-Resolution-Alert-10-August-2016.pdf accessed on 07 
November 2017. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ‘Protection Of ‘Critical 
Infrastructure’ And The Role Of Investment Policies Relating To National 
Security’2008, Available at,https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-
policy/40700392.pdf accessed on 18 November 2017. 
Pay U ‘SA companies under cyber-attack?’ 2015, available at, 
https://www.payu.co.za/press-room/sa-companies-under-cyberattack accessed on 01 
August 2017. 
Paganini P ‘G7 Declaration on responsible state behaviour in Cyberspace’, para 6-7 
2017, available at http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/57932/cyber-warfare-2/g7-
declaration-responsible-states-behavior-cyberspace.html accessed on 05 December 
2017. 
Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union 
‘International Telecommunications Union resolution ’Connect 2020 Agenda for 
global telecommunication/information and communication technology development’ 
adopted in Busan ,2014, available at http://bit.ly/2FXvRLa, accessed on 11 
December 2017. 
Porche I et al ‘Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries, for an army in a wireless 
world’, 2013 available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1100/MG1113/RAND
_MG1113.pdf, accesses on 10 February 2018 xvi. 
Presidential Infrastructure Coordination Commission ‘A summary of the South 
African infrastructure plan’, 2012, available at http://bit.ly/2EdBjJy, accessed on 31 
October 2017. 
110 
‘Removing a Director Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 2015, available at, 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/removing-a-director-under-the-companies-act-71-
of-2008-2015-06-30, accessed on 11 February 2018. 
Rees A ‘Cybercrime Laws of the United States’ US Department of Justice: 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section 2006 available at 
https://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/us_cyb_laws.pdf accessed on 10 February 
2018   
Rogin J ‘NSA Chief: Cybercrime constitutes the “greatest transfer of wealth in 
history’, 2012 available at,http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief-
cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/ access on 04 
December 2017. 
Sarkar R ‘Four Key Cyber risk Management Questions for Directors and Officers’ 
2017, available at, http://www.rmmagazine.com/2017/09/01/four-key-cyberrisk-
management-questions-for-directors-and-officers/ accessed on 15 November 2017. 
Schwab K ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’ World 
Economic Forum 2016, available at http://bit.ly/1pBfye4, accessed on 02 April 2017 
Stadler S & Kok R ‘Protecting your rights as a minority shareholder in South Africa: 
The derivative action’(2015) available at 
http://www.puleinc.co.za/publications/protecting-your-rights-as-a-minority-
shareholder-in-south-africa-the-derivative-action/, accessed on 12 February 2018. 
Smit W ‘Companies Act 2008 – Directors’ Responsibilities and Liability’ 2011 
available at https://www.exceedinc.co.za/news/companies-act-2008-directors-
responsibilities-and-liability/?id=8&entryId=13 , accessed on 12 February 2018. 
Symantec ‘2016 Internet Security Threat Report’, 2017, available at 
https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf, 
46 accessed on 18 November 2017. 
Tamarkin E, ‘The AU’s cybercrime response A positive start, but substantial 
challenges ahead’2015, available at, 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief73_cybercrime.pdf 
accessed on 19 April 2017. 
Tamarkin E ‘Cybercrime: A complex problem requiring a multi-faceted response’ 
Institute for Security Studies 2014, Available at, 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief51Feb14.pdf accessed on 
10 April 2017. 
111 
Tucker C ‘Greater duty of skill by the directors of a bank’ 2003, available at 
http://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/greater-duty-of-skill-by-the-directors-of-a-
bank/ , accessed on 12 February 2018. 
 ‘Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of 
Offenders’ United Nations 2000, available at http://bit.ly/2kjJFXN accessed on 19 
December 2017. 
ThreatBrief ‘Consumers worry more about cybercrime than physical crime’ 2017, 
available at,http://threatbrief.com/consumers-worry-cybercrime-physical-crime/ 
accessed on 04 December 2017. 
The information sharing network  ‘What is critical infrastructure?’ Australian 
National Security 2018, available at, 
https://www.tisn.gov.au/Pages/Critical_infrastructure.aspx ,accessed on 18 
November 2017 
United Nations Human Rights Council ‘32nd session of the Human Rights Council 
(13 June to 1 July and 8 July 2016’, 2016, available at http://bit.ly/1rK70TS, 
accessed on 30 November 2017 
‘UNODC Global Programme on Cybercrime’ available at http://bit.ly/2AN6DvP 
accessed on 04 January 2018. 
UN International Code of Conduct for Information Security Available at 
http://bit.ly/1hFMUph accessed on 04 January 2018. 
US Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act 2016 available at 
http://bit.ly/2D1gvHy., accessed on 10 February 2015. 
Van Zyl G ‘8.8 million South Africans hit by cyber crime - study’ 2016, available 
at,http://www.fin24.com/Tech/News/88-million-south-africans-hit-by-cyber-crime-
study-20160707 accessed on 01 August 2017. 
Van Zyl G ‘Ripe for a digital revolution: 40% of SA now has internet access – 
study’ ,2017, available at https://www.biznews.com/tech/2017/07/19/sa-internet-
access-study/, accessed on 17 November 2017 
Vez J ‘Recommendations for Public-Private Partnerships against Cybercrime’ WEF, 
2016, available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cybercrime_Principles.pdf, 
accessed on 19 April 2017. 
Vullo MT ‘Cybersecurity Requirements For Financial Services Companies’ New 
York Department of Financial Services  2017, available 
at,http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf accessed on 16 
November 2017. 
112 
World Economic Forum ‘Global Information Technology Report 2016’, 2016, 
available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-information-technology-report-
2016/networked-readiness-index, accessed on 15 November 2017. 
National Cyber Policies, Strategies, and Frameworks 
India  
National Cyber Security Policy 2013 
Kenya 
National Cybersecurity Strategy, 2014 
South Africa 
National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan 2030 
National Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa (2015). 
113 
The United States of America 
US DoD Strategy for Operations in Cyberspace 2015 
The United Kingdom 
 UK National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 – 2021 (2016) 
Treaties and Conventions 
African Union Convention on Cybercrime and Data Protection 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
